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ABSTRACT 
The paper presents a theoretical and empirical survey of three canmon 
concerns about ptblic sector debt and deficits. The first is based on the view 
that sooner or later, public sector deficits nust be monetized and will 
therefore lead to inflation. The secorrl concerns the possibility of explosive 
debt-deficit spirals arrl ultimately default or repudiation of the public debt. 
The third relates to "financial crowding out," the decline in interest-sensitive 
or real exchange rate-sensitive private and foreign spending resulting from the 
st:bstitution of borrowing for current taxes. The final section updates the nCM 
12-year old lanent of Blinder and Solow about the misuse of various "model-free" 
neasures of fiscal stance. 
Willen H. BUiter, rrA Guide to Public Sector Debt and Deficits" 
A GUIDE TO PUBLIC SECTOR DEBT AND DEFICITS* 
Introduction 1./ 
Public sector deficits and the burden of the public debt are once 
again at the centre of macroeconomic policy debate. In Britain the 
rhetoric and, to a somewhat lesser extent, the reality of the Medium-Term 
Financial Strategy (MTFS) adopted and pursued since 1980, emphasized the 
primacy of fiscal orthodoxy and sound money, the former being viewed as a 
precondition for the latter. In continental Europe, countries as diverse 
as the German Federal Republic, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and 
Belgiuti ha'\Te felt cpmpelled to make t:he control and t'ednction of public 
sector financial deficits a ( o.ften the) corner.stone of macroeconomic 
policy design, overriding traditional concerns with the use of fiscal 
policy and budgetary deficits as cycl.ica1 stabilization devices. In the 
United States; widespread professional concern about steadily growing 
structural federal deficits is now beginning to be share4 by the admini- · 
Stration and a major political battle to contain and cut back the deficit 
through spendin:g cuts and/or tax increases is under way. 
The concern about public ,sector cie-bt and deficits is most easily 
understood when one first considers the extremely rarified set of condi­
tions under which the magnitude of public sector debt and deficits would 
be irrelevant. Right away, it should be emphasized that "debt neutrality" 
or non-neutrality refers to the absence or presence of real effects 
from alternative ways of financing a given program of spending on real 
goods and services (or "exhaustive" spending program). Changes in the 
amount and/or composition of the real exhaustive spending program will 
*The research reported here is part of the NBER's research program in 
Financial Markets and Monetary Economics. Any opinions expressed are 
those of the author and not those of the National Bureau of Economic 
Research 
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(almost) always have real effects. The only exception would be when 
public consumption or investment is a perfect substitute for private 
In what follows theconsumption or investment (see Buiter [1977]). 
principal focus of attention are the consequences of substituting bond 
financing (or borrowing) for tax financing of a given real exhaustive 
spending program. The scope for and consequences of money financing are 
also considered in some detail. "Debt neutrality" will preV'ail when: 
(a) private agents can lend and borrow on the same terms as the government; 
(b) private agents are a.ble and willing to undo any government scheme to 
redistribute real income between successive generations by making offset­
ting voluntary intergenerational transfers (bequests or gifts to the 
younger generation); and (e) there are no distortionary tues, transfers 
or subsidies, i.e., all taxes, transfers, and subsidies are "lump-sum" 
(Bttrrot [1974]). 
For (b) to hold, private agents either must live forever or achieve 
the economic equivalent of eternal life by being endowed with operative 
intergenerational gift and bequest motives. Retired parents must, e.g.; 
be willing and able to return, through increased bequests to their working 
children, the income the government is redistributing from the children to 
the parents by means of national insurance contributions by the children 
that are used to finance the parents' pensions. In reality, private 
decision horizons are finite and frequently quite short both because 
of the nature of private tastes and objectives and because of binding 
constraints encountered in a variety of financial and capital markets. 
As regards the former, not everybody is a bearer of intergenerational 
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goodwill. Even among those who love their parents and children, the 
probability of childlessness in the current and future generations will 
raise the effective intergenerational discount rate applied by house­
holds. As regards the latter, capital market imperfections are an 
important restraint on the ability of households (and many private firms) 
to make intertemporal transfers of resources. Credit rationing, liquidity 
constraints, large spreads between borrowing and lending rates, and public 
sector borrowing rates that are significantly below private borrowing 
rates are an established empirical fact in most industrialized countries. 
There also exists a rich and varied theoretical literature which can 
explain s:uch capital market imperfections and the often associated non­
Walrasian equilibria in ways that do not imply the wholesale abandonment 
of cherished notions of rationality•. The new and burgeoning literature 
on asytlml.etric information and the implications of moral hazard and adverse 
selection for equilibrium behavior in private financial markets is espe­
cially illuminating in this regard. 2/ Even if there were no uncertainty 
about the exogenous enviro!lment Qr the characteristics of other economic 
agents, abandoning the assumption of price-taking or passive competitive 
behaviour by one of game-theoretic or active competitive behaviour may 
be sufficient to yield (inefficient) credit rationing as an equilibrium 
outcome in a wide range of plausible market settings. 1/ 
Even if private agents have operative intergenerational gift and 
bequest motives and face perfect capital markets, the non-lump sum, 
distortionary nature of taxes, transfers, and subsidies may lead to non­
neutrality o.f the substitution of borrowing for current taxation. Such 
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"second order" non-neutralities (Barro [ 1979]) can, under certain .restric­
tive assumptions, lead to a prescription of tax "smoothing" or constant 
(expected) tax rates over time. Temporary deficits or surpluses would in 
general be associated with the pursuit of policies that minimize the 
excess burden, efficiency loss, or collection costs of the tax system. 
Absent debt neutrality, alternative modes of financing a given 
programme of "exhaustive" public spending will have real consequences in 
the· short run and in the long run. In the short run, the substitution of 
borrowiag for taxation increases ex-ante private consU1J1.ption and reduces 
private investment.!:,./ (Under debt neutrality, an increase in the public 
sector financial deficit due to a tax cut would induce a matching increase 
in private saving.) In the long run, the reduction in private investment 
lowers the path of the capital-labour and capital-output ratios. In an 
open economy, bond-financed tax cuts are likely to lead to a deterioration 
of the current account in the. short run and to an increase in the external 
debt burden in the long run. These are the familiar short run and long 
run "crowding out" consequences of public sector deficits. Together with 
some less familiar forms of financial crowding out they are surveyed in 
Section 5. Whether or to what extent a tax cut and the associated ex-
ante increase in private consumption imply an ex-post reduction in total 
domestic (private and public) saving depends on the "regime" under which 
the economic system operates. If output is demand-constrained, the tax 
cut will, by boosting consumption demand, raise output and employment 
through the familiar Keynesian demand multiplier mechanism. Total domestic 
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saving need fall only a little. If real wage rigidity, real resource 
bottlenecks or other "classical" constraints are binding, the ex-ante 
and ex-post stories are the satne and "crowding out" is inevitable. 
Besides crowding out fears, there are two other reasons why public 
sector deficits have a bad reputation. The first is based on the view 
that sooner or later, public sector deficits must be monetised and will 
therefore lead to inflation. This proposition is analysed in Section 3. 
The second fear relates to the doomsday scenario which envisages the 
possibility of explosive debt-deficit spirals and ultimately repudiation 
of the public debt. The threat of bankruptcy of the Exchequer is analysed 
in Section 4. The last section of the paper, Section 6, draws conclusions 
from the preceding sections concerning the meaning and relevance of 
various measures o~ fiscal stance that have been proposed. 
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2. Public Sector Debt and Deficits in the United 
Kingdom: Some Statistical Facts 
The main facts about the behaviour of the public sector deficit and 
debt in the United Kingdom are given in Figures 1 to 4 and in Tables 1 
to 4 below. Figures 1 and 2 display very long-time series for the debt-GDP 
ratio and the debt service-GDP ratio respectively. Figure 1 brings out 
the familiar fact that gove.rnments incur most of their debt during or 
immediately following major wars and use peacetime conditions to reduce 
the debt-output ratio. The data since 1801 show that the period following 
the Napoleonic Wars saw the all---time peak of the debt-GDP ratio at 2.88 in 
1821. From there on until the beginning of the First World War, the debt­
GDP ratio declined with only slight interruptions, reaching an all-time 
low of 0.29 in 1914. This reduction in the debt-output ratio between 
1820 and 1914 was brought about partly by debt-retirement (from a peak 
value of i844.3 million in 1819 to a low of £620.2 million in 1912). 
A remarkable feature of this period is, however, that this decline in the 
debt-GDP ratio was accompanied by a steady, if gentle, decline in the 
general price level. It was real output growth rather than "amortisation" 
through inflation that accounted for the bulk of the reduction in the 
debt-GDP ratio during the century before World War I. After World War I 
the debt-GDP ratio reached a "local" peak of 2.09 in 1924. It then 
declined steadily through the stagnation of the late twenties and the 
onset of the Great Depression until it had reached 1.79 in 1930. From 
1931 it increased to 2.07 in 1934 after which it fell again until 1940. 
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in 1947. The ratio then declined steadily until 1975 when it reached 
0.48. Since the mid-seventies it has remained roughly stationary around 
o. so. 
Figure 2 shows that the behaviour of the debt-service-GDP ratio for 
the United Kingdom parallelled that of the debt-GDP ratio from 1821 until 
1941. The local peak reached in 1947 was, however, below that of the 
second half of the 20s. Debt service declined by less than 2 percentage 
points of GDP between 1947 and 1973 after which it rose again to its 
1946--47 level of 6 percent of GDP in 1981 with a small decline since then. 
The stability of the debt-service ratio between 1951 and 1971 relative 
to the decline in the debt ratio is accounted for in large measure by 
the increase in the nominal interest rates over the period. Real interest 
rates were negative for much of the 60s and 70s. 
A comparison of the U.K.'s debt-GDP ratio and of its public debt­
service-GDP ratio with that of the other OECD countries is given in 
Table 1 and Figure 3. 
It shows that, as regards thedebt...,.GDP ratio of the general government 
(Federal, State and Local), the United Kingdom in 1970 (with 86.2 percent) 
was well above the average for the major seven OECD countries (39.6 per­
cent) and the average for the OECD as a whole. By 1983, the u.K. ratio, 
at 54.2 percent, was in line with the major seven countries average 
(50.8 percent) and the OECD average of 50.7 percent. The United Kingdom 
was the only major industrial country to achieve a significant reduction 
in its debt-GDP ratio between 1970 and 1983. Japan, Germany, and Italy 
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TABLE 1 
Debt service burden on the general government sector 
(as percentage of nominal GNP/GDP) 
Debt outstanding Debt interest payments 
i Cs! a19i0 1983 1970 1975 1980 I 
1983 - ; ... 
United States
C 
46.2 45.8 2.2 2.5 3.3 4.6 -'· . C; 
(1. 2) (1-2) (1.3) (2.1) (2. ~) 
Japan 12.0 . 66. 8d 0.6 1.2 3.2 4.~ ~ ;.. 
3.0Ge.p:nany 18.4 41.1 1.0 1.4 1.9 3.0 
:ranee 29.4 32.6d 1.1 1.3 1.6 2.6 3.0 
United Kingdom 86.2 54.2d 3.9 4.0 5.6 4.9 4.i 
Italy 44.4 84.5 1.7 4.0 6.3 9.1 9.6 
55. 5d 3.8 4.0 5.6 7.2 7.6Canada 5.3.7 
Tot.al major seven countries
e 39.6 50.8 1.9 2.3 3.4 4.6 .!.i .9 
Australia 41. 7 24.8d 2.5 2.1 3.2 4.0 ...'· _,( 
3.3Austria 19.4 44.Sd l.0 1.3 2.5 3.1 
Belgium 73.3 115 .6d 3.4 3.5 6.1 9.S 9.5 
Der~rk 11.3 63.0 1.4 1.2 3.9 8.1 9.5 
1
Finland 15.5 19.4d 1.0 o. i 1.0 -. :::,- l.i 
Greece 21.3 41. 9 LO 1.4 2.4 2.9 2 .Q; 
Netherlands 51.4 61.4d 2.9 3.9 3.7 5.7 6.2 
Norway 48.4 44.6d 1.8 2.1 3.. 9 3.9 3.8 
Spain 14.4 0.6 
.,--~,31.3 0.5 0.8 1.3 
s~edeo 30.7 66.9d 1. 9 2.2 4.2 7.7 7.i 
Total smaller countries
e 34.8 49.6 l. 9 2.0 3.1 4.6 5.0 
Total of above countries
e 38.9 50.i 1.9 2.3 3.4 4.6 4.9 
Source: O.E.C.D. Economic Outlook, December 1984. 
Notes: a. OECD Forecasts
b. OECD projections b~sed on.the mechanical assumptions indicated in 
footnote in the text. 
c. Fi21.1res in brackets corresoond to net interest payments. 
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saw large increases while the United States was about constant over that 
period (but rising rapidly, and even explosively towards the end of the 
period). All major industrial countries saw a rise in the debt-service 
ratio between 1970 and 1984. The increase was monotonic for all but the 
United Kingdom whose debt-service ratio peaked (at 5.6 percent) in 1980 
and has since fallen to 4.7 percent, slightly below the major country 
and overall OECD average of 4.9 percent. 
In table 2, I present a decomposition of the change in the U. K. debt­
output ratio since 1948 into three parts: the part "due to" the public 
sector deficit; the part "due to" inflation; and the part "due to" real 
output growth. Note that this is a purely arithmetic, ex-post accounting 
exercise. Letting L denote the nominal value of the public debt, p the 
general price level, and .Y real output, it follows that: 
.61. APL AY L 
C<A(~y) - --p pY --pYpY y 
change in deficit as erosion of the erosion of the debt-
debt-GDP "' a fraction - debt-GDP ratio - GDP ratio due to real 
ratio of GDP due to inflation output growth 
From Table 2 ( where column 2 corresponds to A(~y), column 3 to :;, 
-~L -AYLcolumn 4 to p pY' and column 5 to YpY), we see that the total 
change in the debt-GDP ratio between 1948 and 1984 of -1.944 can be almost 
exactly accounted for by the effect of inflation on the real value of the 
outstanding nominal government debt. The cumulative contribution of the 
deficits was to increase the ratio by 1.06, while real growth lowered the 
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TABLE • 
in U.K. debt-output ratio 1949-1983 
Contribution Contribution 
















































































all of the reduction in the debt-output ratio since 1948 should not lead 
one to conclude that the way further to amortise the public debt is to 
have another bout of inflation. A conjunction of higher inflation, higher 
real interest rates, low real growth, and large public sector deficits is 
not unthinkable; and it would result in higher 'inflation going hand-in­
hand with a rising debt burden. Inflation, the debt burden, and real 
growth are jointly endogenous variables, and, depending on the values of 
the "deep" structural paramters and the nature of the exogenous disturbances 
driving the economic system, almost any pattern of covariation between 
them could be generated. 1f 
Figure 4 shows the U.K. public sector financial deficit (PSFD) as a 
proportion of GDP since 1946 and the public sector borrowing requirement 
( PSBR) since 1955. Of the two, the PSFD is the more informative, as the 
PSBR puts "above the line" (counts as current receipts) the proceeds from 
certain categories of asset sales which the PSFD properly puts "below the 
line" (i.e., counts as financing). Table 3 reproduces the Bank of 
England's "inflation corrections" to the PSBR, i.e., an estimate of what 
the PSBR would have been if debt service had been costed at ex-post real 
interest rates. 6/ The PSBR explosion from 1975 (an increase in the PSBR­
GDP ratio by 11.75 percentage points) is reduced to an increase in the 
inflation-corrected PSBR-GDP ratio of only 3.5 percentage points (moving 
from a 5.1 percent surplus to a 1.6 percent surplus). The cumulative 
inflation-corrected PSBR between 1967 and 1983 (as a percentage of GDP) 
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TABLE 3 
The "inflation-corrected" PSBR in the U.K. since 1967 
"Inflation "Inflation- '' Inf1at ion-correct ec! ''
PSBR correction" corrected" PSBR as a proportion
£ BillionYear £ Billion PSBR £ Billion of GDP at market prices 
(4) ,,,,.(1) {2) (3) 
__ :,.
1967 l.8 -0.8 l.O 
") 
1968 1.3 -1.2 0.1 0.2 
-5.l1969 -0.5 -1.9 -2.4 
1970 -0.0 -2.7 -2.7 -5.2 
-3.3l9il 1.3 -3.2 -1.9 
1972 2o0 -3.1 -1.1 -1. 7 
0.11973 4.1 -4.0 0.1 
-9.3 -3.41974 6.4 -2.9 
1975 10.2 -11.9 -1.7 -1.6 
1976 9.0 -i.5 1.5 1.2 
1977 5.5 -9.4 -3.9 -2.7 
1978 8.5 -6.7 1.8 1.1 
1979 12. 7 -14.9 -2.2 -1.1 
-0.61980 11.8 -13 .1 -1.3 
1981 10. 6 -12.3 -1. 7 -0. 7 
-0.81982 s.o -7.3 -2.3 
1983 11.6 -5.9· 5.7 1.9 
Source: Bank of £nsla.nd Quarterlz Bulletin., June 1980 and June 1984. 
Note: Column 2 - Sectoral net monetary assets x percentage of change in consumers' 
deflater (an exchange rate correction is applied to assets and liabilities 
denominated in foreign currency). 
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3. Deficits, Debt and Inflation 
The fear that public sector deficits eventually will be monetized 
and thus lead to inflation is a deep-rooted one among economic policy 
makers, officials of treasuries, central banks, international organiza­
tions, and among the public at large. There are two distinct but not 
mutually exclusive views of the debt-deficit-inflation nexus. The first 
emphasizes the incentive for a government to reduce the real value of 
its outstanding stock of interest-bearing, nominally-denominated (i.e., 
non-index-linked) debt through an unexpected burst of inflation. The 
second, recently restated by Sargent and Wallace [1981], emphasizes the 
long--run inflationary consequences of a short- or medium-term switch from 
money or tax financing to debt f:i.nancing of a given public spending pro­
graI1llll.e. This second view does not require inflationary surprises in 
order to be valid. 
a • .Amortizing the public debtthrough inflation 
There are four ways through which governments can reduce the 
real value of their debt. 7/
. - First, at a given general price level and a 
given nominal price of bonds, they can run a budget surplus. Second, 
they can attempt to reduce the real value of the outstanding stock of 
debt, at a given general price level, by pursuing or announcing policies 
that cause a drop in bond prices. Third, an inflationary policy can 
reduce the real value of the inherited stock of debt, even with a balanced 
budget and given nominal bond prices. Finally, a government can formally 
repudiate part or all of its debt. The discussion of this final option 
is left to the next section. 
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Why should governments wish to reduce the real value of their debt? 
We can distinguish distributional and efficiency reasons. The distri­
butional issues are fairly straightforward. Those who hold the debt and 
those who pay the taxes that service the debt are not the same people. 
Typically, debt is owned (directly or indirectly through pension funds 
and other financial institutions) by people who are, on average, both 
older and richer than the representative taxpayer. The recurrent caricature 
of the toiling workers supporting the idle (retired?) rentiers is an 
exaggerated version of this distributional conflict. In the short run, 
debt debasement favours labour, and the young in general, at the expense 
of rentiers and older people. The efficiency argument focuses on the 
role of public debt in crowding out private saving and capital formation. 
If the authorities judge the domestic rate of capital formation to be 
less than the optimal rate, one possible remedy is to stimulate private 
saving by reducing the real value of the financial claims of the private 
sector on the public sector. Provided this can be achieved without a 
Keynesian slump in effective demand, such a policy will stimulate both 
private saving and investment. 
A systematic view of the deficit-debt-inflation nexus starts from 
the consolidated government budget identity given in equation (1). 
(1) G - T + 8/ 
Mt is the stock of high-powered money or base money outstanding at the 
beginning of period t. For simplicity, the entire maturity structure of 
the debt is summarized by its two extremes. Very short debt, with a 
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fixed nominal market price (set equal to unity) and a variable interest 
rate is, is outstanding in an amount B~. Very long debt, perpetuities 
or consols with a fixed nominal coupon, c, and a variable market price 
~ =c/i~ is outstanding in amount B~. i~ is the long nominal rate 
of interest or the coupon yield on consols. Zt is the stock of official 
foreign exchange reserves, and et the price of foreign exchange. 9/ Gt is 
the real value of "exhaustive" public spending on goods and S'ervices, Tt 
the real value of taxes net of transfers, and Pt the general price level. 
Equation (1) is often referred to as the government budget "'constraint" 
or (worse) as the budget "restraint." Budget identity much more accurately 
reflects the nature of (1). It is an identity linking all public sector 
sources of funds and uses of funds together. The constraint lies not in 
(1) but in the limits we set, implicitly or explicitly, on the government's 
ability to borrow (i.e., on the real stock of debt or the debt-output 
ratio), in the lower bound we impose on the stock of foreign exchange reserves 
and in the constraints, political or through the demand for real money 
balances, imposed on the real value of the resoures that the government 
can appropriate through seigniorage: M/P. This issue will be reviewed 
below when the solvency of the government is analysed. 
We define the primary deficit, D, to be the deficit exclusive of 
interest payments and other debt-service 
(2) D - p(G - T) 
Equation (1) states the well-known fact that the primary deficit plus 
interest payments on the outstanding debt must be financed by borrowing 
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short or long, by printing money or by running down foreign exchange 
reserves. While even in the post-Bretton Woods era purchases and sales 
of official foreign exchange reserves have not disappeared, I shall for 
simplicity of exposition ignore fluctuations in official foreign exchange 
holdings. 
Equation (1) then simplifies to 
=BS + ;eLBLThe change in the real value of the debt, b p . , is the sum of 
. . D + i SBS + c,BLthe real value of the budget def1.c1.t · · · · · · •- , net of the amount of p 
money financing or seigniorage (in real terms) M/P, and the increase 
(reduction) in the real value of the outstanding stock of debt due to a 
falling (rising) general price level, p, and/or a rising (falling) price 
of bonds, pL • 
. 
(3) b 
Let JJ denote the single-period or instantaneous proportional rate 
of growth of the nominal money stock; JJ =M/M, m =M/p, the real stock 
of high powered money, and d =D/p, the real primary deficit. The 
presentation of the results is facilitated greatly if we that theassume 
short and long interest rates are related to each other through the 
"expectations hypothesis" of the term structure. With risk-neutral 
operators in financial markets this implies that the expected rate of 
return on long bonds (including any expected capital gain or loss due to 
changes in the price of long bonds) must equal the yield on short bonds, 
or, letting Et denote expectations formed at time t: 
- 21 -
( 4) . s l.t 
We can then write the expected or planned change in the real value of the 
public debt as: 
. 
( 5) E( b) - d + rsb - JJm 
If Ut denotes the surprise or unexpected value at time t, then ex­
post, the actual value of the change in the real stock of debt is given 
by 
. 
( 6) b = E(b) + U(b) = 
Equation (6) shows that a correctly anticipated policy of inflation 
will not affect the real stock of public debt outstanding unless it 
affects the real primary deficit, d, the ex-ante short real interest 
rate, rs, or the real revenue from money creation (real seigniorage) 
lJm =M/P. An unanticipated inflation policy may in addition lower 
the real value of the public debt by causing private bondholders to under­
predict the inflation rate (U(p/p) > 0) or overpredict the increase in 
the price of long-dated debt (U(pL/PL < 0). 
The theoretical and empirical case for an effect of a fully anti­
cipated and well-understood inflation policy on the ex-ante real interest 
rate is open. 1.9./ A reasonable benchmark is to assume that higher expected 
inflation is fully reflected in nominal interest rates, leaving the real 
rate unaffected. 
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The extent to which the real primary deficit is affected by inflation 
depends on the institutional, legal, administrative, and political frame­
work governing the determination of public spending and taxation. E.g., 
with a progressive and incompletely indexed tax system, there will be an 
increase in the real tax burden through "bracket creep" when the general 
price level rises. Depending on the way in which they are implemented, a 
system of "cash limits" may lead to an (unexpected) reduction in the real 
value of public spending when there is an (unexpected) increase in the 
price level. l!) 
The implications of a more inflationary policy for real seigniorage 
revenue are quite straightforward. If we limit ourselves to the case of 
a sustained increase in the rate of inflation, this higher rate of 
inflation is likely to be associated with an equal increase in the trend 
rate of growth of base money. Let the demand for real money balances, 
md, be a decreasing function of the short nominal interest rate and of 
the rate of inflation, 1r, and an increasing function of real national 
income, y, i.e. 
= 'y) .. O· 1 'O;' 
The effect of a higher rate of growth of the nominal money stock on real 
seigniorage m, if inflation changes one-for-one with money growth and if 
real output and the real interest rate are invariant under changes in 
the rate of inflation, is given by: 
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(7) m + l-( 1 s + 1 n) 
i 
Real seigniorage, therefore, increases with the rate of money growth if 
and only if the (absolute value of the) total (direct and indirect through 
iS) inflation elasticity of demand for real money balances is less than 
Tr/ ll. If the natural rate of growth is not too large, this becomes the 
familiar condition that higher inflation increases real seigniorage if 
the inflation elasticity of demand for high-powered money is below unity. 
I estimated a simple demand for high-powered money function for the 
United Kingdom using annual data from 1948 to 1984. The dependent vari­
able was M/P, the real monetary base (the wide monetary base deflated by 
the GDP deflator at factor cost). Independent variables were a constant, 
a time trend, current and lagged values of real output, y (real GDP at 
factor cost), a short nominal interest rate, iS (the three-month Treasury 
Bill yield after 1960, the three-month Treasury Bill discount rate up to 
1960), a long nominal interest rate, iL (the yield on consols or the 
British government securities long dated (20 years) yield), the rate of 
inflation p/p (the proportional rate of change of the GDP deflator at 
factor cost), and lagged values of the real monetary base. 
The best estimate in terms of residual autocorrelation, parameter 
stability, and goodness of fit is given below in equation (8). (Figures 




= -3.47271 - .0253356t + .955959lny - .515961.E. + .669274ln(¥)
(10.0858) (9.91106) (10.2741) (12.4063)P (16.8825) 
SSR = .00415094; SER - .0115716; R2 = .9916; R2 = .9905; 
DW = 1.8253; No. of observations= 36; 1948-84; F(4, 31) = 912.194 
When the inflation rate was included as a regressor, neither the 
short interest rate nor either of the two long rates were significant. 
The semi-elasticity of the demand for real base money with respect to the 
inflation rate has a long•run value of -1.56. The estimated long-run 
income elasticity of demand for high-powered money is an implausibly high 
2.89. The estimate of the annual trend decline in the demand for base 
money is 7.66 percent. Ideally, the trend should capture the consequences 
of institutional changes in the financial, monetary, and payments mechan­
isms that were responsible for the secular increase in money base velocity 
over the sample period. It seems likely that current income captures 
mainly cyclical effects on velocity and that part of the effect of trend 
or permanent income is picked up by the trend term. I tried to allow for 
this by more general lag structures for y (as well as for the other 
regressors), and by adding private consumption (or the sum of private and 
public consumption) as a better proxy for permanent income, but this 
did not yield more plausible results. Specifying the relationship in 
per capita terms worsened things, i.e., the point estimates of the long-
run income elasticity of high-powered money demand and of the long-run 
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annual trend decline in money demand both increased. Simultaneity 
problems may well arise in connection with equation (8), through the 
output and inflation terms. Re-estimating (8) using an instrumental 
variable estimator (with public spending on goods and services, the 
volume of world trade, a measure of the world price level and the U.S. 
three-month Treasury Bill rate as instruments) did not lead to signifi­
cantly different coefficient estimates but worsened the residual auto­
correlation properties. 
Frotn (8) a value of -1.5 for the inflation semi•elasticity would be 
reasonable. The annual inflation rate would have to exceed 67 percent 
for a further increase in the rate of inflation to yield a reduction in 
real government revenue from money creation. JJ:_/ While historical and 
foreseeable inflation rates would seem to place the British economy in 
the range where higher inflation rates still boost total revenue from 
the "inflation tax," the amounts involved are small. Table 4 shows the 
historical insignificance of seigniorage revenue in the British economy. 
It would have taken an increase in the tax burden of only 0.55 percent 
of GDP in order to do away with the need for revenue from seigniorage 
altogether. It therefore seems implausible to base a positive theory 
of inflation for Britain on the perceived need of successive governments 
to extend the tax base and find a further source of revenue. I would go 
further and argue that the fact that we have experienced (and are still 
experiencing) any inflation at all in the United Kingdom and the other 
industrial countries (albeit at rates well below the seigniorage-maximizing 
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TABU 4 
Seignorage as a source of revenue ~n the U.K. 1948-1983 
Change in money Change in money base
Change in money., base as a % as a % of generalbase as a I> of total tax govermnent taxes and 
of GDP receipts* N. I. contributions 
(1) (2) (3) 
-1.0.!; -2.43 -2.59 
0.13 0.29 0.31 
o.oo 0.00 0.00 
o.4i 1.15 1.24 
0.52 1~32 1.41 
o. 6i l.81 1.96 
0.65 . l. 79 1.94 
0.63 l.71 1.86 
0.51 1.45 1.59 
0.44 1.24 1.36 
0.38 1.03 1.1.3 
0.42 1.16 1.29 
0.52 1.48 1.65 
0~44 1.23 1.36 
0.12 0.32 0.35 
0.24 0.66 o. 73 
0.57 1.56 1.73 
0.5$ 1.52 1.69 
0.51 1.25 1.40 
0.28 0.67 0.74 
0.49 . 1.11 1.13 
0.33 0.69 0.77 
0.32 0.67 0.74 
0.65 l.45 1.67 
0.43 0.99 1.11 
0.8'2 1. 97 2.22 
o. 76 1. 70 l.91 
0.83 1.86 2.07 
0.69 1.57 l.76 
0.61 1.38 1.54 
0.81 1.90 2.12 
o.72 1.62 l.81 
0.41 0.89 LOO 
0.32 0.66 0.74 
0.04 0.09 0.10 
0.27 0.55 0.60 
Taxes, contributions, trading income, rent, royalties,"* ~- 1. 
Money-base 
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level) cannot be rationalized in terms of the optimal trade-off between 
seigniorage and the other sources of revenue. Instead it seems likely 
that the increasing inflation rates and rates of monetary growth of the 
sixies and seventies were the byproduct of policies aimed at maintaining 
capacity utilization rates and unemployment rates in the face of deterior­
ating supply-side conditions, and/or of attempts to exploit a non-existent 
long-run employment-inflation trade-off, regardless of the revenue 
implications of the increasing rates of monetary growth. In other words, 
the data support the screw-up theory of inflation rather than the optimal 
seigniorage theory of inflation. 
Not only has seigniorage historically been an insignificant source 
of government revenue in the United Kingdom, my estimate of the demand 
for narrow money in equation (8) suggests that the maximum possible 
yield of this tax is also small. With a constant seurl.-elasticity of 
-1.S, the seigniorage-maximizing annual inflation rate is 67 percent and 
the maximal seigniorage in url.d-sample 1967 is 2.74 percent of GDP. Earlier 
work yielded a seignoriage"'111B.xiurl.zing annual inflation rate of SO percent 
and maximal seigniorage in mid-sample of 1.9 percent of GDP. Both esti­
mates lead one to conclude that expected inflation appears to be a costly 
way of raising additional government revenue. These calculations are 
no more than recreational and should be taken as indicative, at most, of 
orders of magnitude. 
Seigniorage revenue, defined here as revenue from the expected 
inflation tax is of course but one part of the total inflation tax. 
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Unanticipated inflation is potentially the most important means by which 
a government can reduce the real value of its nominally denominated 
debt other than through formal repudiation or default. From equation 
(6) it can be seen that unanticipated inflation reduces the real value 
of all debt (other than index-linked debt) and that an unexpected decline 
in the price of long debt further reduces the real value of debt with 
longer maturities. Even moderate unexpected changes in the rate of­
inflation can have dramatic effects on the market value of long-dated 
non-indexed debt, if these changes are expected to persist. This can be 
seen as follows. 
If the expectations theory of the term structure holds, and if short 
nominal interest rates are expected to be the same in the future as they 
are today, the price of consols will be related to the current short rate 
as in equation (9). 13/-
( 9) pL( t) = C 
iS 
If the rate of inflation goes up by one percentage point and if the 
short real interest rate is unaffected by the rate of inflation then the 
price of consols will fall by (iL)-1 percentage points. E.g., with 
iL = 0.10, a 1 percentage point increase in the rate of inflation will 
cause a 10 percent drop in the price of consols. More generally, with 
long bonds characterized by a constant coupon c, time remaining to matur­
ity T-t, and a redemption value of pB(T), the price pB is related to the 
current short interest rate if short rates are expected to remain constant 
as follows: 1.!:J 
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(10) 
The effect of an increase in the current and expected future short 
rate on the price of long bonds of any maturity is easily seen to be 
negative. 11/ Higher current and expected future short nominal interest 
rates associated with higher expected future inflation, which was unanti­
cipated at the time that the longer maturity nominal debt was issued, 
will not be reflected in the coupon rate or the issue price of these 
long-term bond issues. This will therefore lead to a fall in the market 
value of this debt, and effectively serve as an unexpected levy on bond­
holders. In the bondholders' balance sheet this will show up as a capital 
loss. From the government's point of view it is akin to amortization of 
part of its long-term debt. 
In principle, even very short-term debt can be amortized this way, 
if it is possible to engineer an unexpected instantaneous discrete jump 
in the general price level. Unlike the price of government debt instru­
ments, which are traded in an organized and (technically) highly efficient 
set of financial markets, the general price level (e.g., the CPI or the 
GDP deflator) does not, pace the New Classical Macroeconomics, behave 
like an asset price set in an efficient auction market. In an open 
economy it may be possible to "jump" the price level on an unsuspecting 
private sector (through an unexpected discrete devaluation of the exchange 
rate) to the extent that the relevant domestic price index moves with the 
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exchange rate; but for a country like Britain this is not an attractive 
option. l!:J With very short maturity debt, floating rate debt (and of 
course index-linked debt) the scope for governments to lower the ex-post 
real rate of return on their debt significantly below the ex-ante expected 
real rate, is quite limited. Figure 5 shows the reduction in the average 
maturity of the British public debt that has taken place since 1945. 
The data have their problems. They reflect nominal values rather 
than market values, which may be a serious matter in the case of long 
debt, and the maturity classification is very coarse. There could be 
coiisiderable changes in average maturity due to changes in maturity 
structure within each of the three categories which would not be picked 
up by our Chart. Finally, index-linked debt should, for our purposes, be 
taken out of the totals. 17/ This shortening of the debt structure (which-
has also occurt'ed in the United States) has made unexpected inflation 
less effective as a means of liquidating real debt. Note that merely 
observin-g (ex-post) a decline in the nominal market value (and therefore 
a fortiori the real value) of long-dated, non-index-linked debt during 
inflationary periods is not sufficient to conclude that the government 
was cheating the bondholders. A smooth, continuous decline in nominal 
bond prices (as opposed to a discrete, discontinuous drop in bond prices) 
is perfectly consistent with the unfolding of an inflation scenario that 
was fully anticipated right from the time the long bonds were first 
issued. Neither are negative ex-post, realized rates of return on 
government debt necessarily evidence of a government welshing on its 
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FIGURE 5' 
The maturity structure of the U.K. public debt* 1945-198
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implicit debt obligations. There is no economic law to ensure that ex­
ante, anticipated real rates of return should be positive. Evidence of 
governmental dishonesty requires independent measurement of both ex-ante 
and ex-post rates of returns on public debt and the demonstration that 
deliberate government actions contributed to the private sector over­
estimating the returns from holding public debt. 
By issuing only index-linked debt, governments would lose the option 
of reducing the real value of their debt by unexpected inflation. Seignior­
age revenue, the expected inflation tax, could of course still be extracted. 
By reducing the benefits to the government from unexpected inflation, the 
indexation of the public debt (and indeed of the tax-transfer and exhaustive 
spending rules) might make a government commitment to a policy of stable 
prices more credible and time-consistent. 
b. Debt, deficitsl and monetization 
The recurrent notion that deficits will, eventually, have to be 
monetized, has been formalized fairly recently in a paper by Sargent and 
Wallace [1981] (see also Buiter [1982] and Sargent [1983]). In a nutshell, 
the argument can be put as follows. Public sector deficits are financed 
either by printing money or by borrowing. After some date, T, the debt-
output ratio b =b/y is kept constant: b( t) = b( T) , t ;;, T. With an 
exogenously given real primary deficit, money financing then becomes 
endogenous. It is the residual financing mode. The real interest rate 
rs is assumed to be fixed and to exceed the trend rate of growth of real 
output, n. With the debt-output ratio constant after T, new issues of 
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debt are just sufficient to offset the downward effects of inflation and 
real output growth on the debt-output ratio. Money growth after Tis 
therefore given by: 
(11) i(t) - v(t)[d(t) + (rs - n)b(T)] t > T 
vis the income velocity of circulation of money and d the primary 
deficit as a proportion of output. 
To estimate the eventual monetization implied by the fiscal stance 
one must therefore calculate the "inflation-and-real-growth-corrected" 
deficit as a proporation of GDP: d + (rS-n)b. Note that the debt-
output ratio bin this calculation is a sustainable and sustained debt­
output ratio. Care must be taken not to indentify it with the currently 
oneobserved ratio of the market value of the public debt to output, when 
wishes to estimate the inflation-and-real-growth-corrected deficit that 
would be observed if a lower rate of inflation were to be achieved 
rsunexpectedly. Assume such an unexpected reduction in inflation leaves 
unchanged and reduces current and expected future iS one-for-one. At a 
given general price level, the real value of nominally denominated, long­
dated debt will increase as a result of the decline in current and expected 
future short nominal interest rates (see equations (9) and (10) and the 
discussion of this issue in the previous subsection.) (rS-n)(BS/pY + 
pLBL/pY) will therefore increase even if rs, n, Bs, BL, p and Y are 
unchanged, because pL will increase. In order to stabilize the debt-output 
ratio at its current value, surpluses (measured conventionally) will 
have to be run to couteract the increase in the real value of long-dated 
nominal debt as inflation declines. 18/ 
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A number of conclusions can be drawn from equation (11). First, if 
the real interest rate exceeds the real growth rate, a higher debt-output 
ratio will be associated with a higher proportional rate of growth of 
the nominal money stock, unless velocity falls (the demand for money per 
unit of output increases) so as to offset the higher debt service burden. 
If the real interest rate instead of being constant increased with the 
debt-output ratio, these conclusions would be reinforced (see W.R. Buiter 
[1982]). Thus, any financing policy prior to T that leads to increased 
debt accumulation (a higher value of b(T)), will require higher 
real seigniorage lJm after T, and thus, if money demand is less than unit 
elastic with respect to the inflation rate, a higher rate of growth of 
nominal money and, sooner or later, more inflation. 
We saw before that the (steady-state) revenue from seigniorage is 
maximized when the inflation elasticity of money demand equals (approxi­
mately) unity. If inflation is a "bad," no rational government would 
permit inflation to rise above the seigniorage-ma:idtnizing level, i.e., 
operate on the wrong side of the "seigniorage Laffer curve." 
In Britain, the income-velocity of circulation of high-powered money 
has risen steadily since the end of World War II, from 5.00 in 1946 to 20.24 
in 1983. Even in the most favourable case where velocity is constant 
rather than increasing with the rate of inflation, a British government 
would be unlikely to choose to finance an increase in debt service due 
to a higher debt-output ratio by printing money rather than by raising 
explicit taxes. With a constant velocity of 20 and a real interest rate 
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that is 2 percentage points above the trend growth rate of output, an 
extra 10 percentage points on the debt-output ratio would require a 
4.0 percent increase in the rate of money growth and thus in the long-run 
rate of inflation. 11/ To finance the increased debt service at an 
unchanged rate of inflation by raising taxes would require an increase in 
taxes (or cut in transfer payments) equal to one-fifth of one percent of 
GNP only. 20/ It would be very unlikely for an economy like the United 
Kingdom, with a well-developed financial system (reflected in a high 
money base velocity) and a reasonably broad tax base, to choose .. secular" 
money financing over tax financing. The situation is of course quite 
different for a number of third world countries. Many of them have 
relatively rudimentary internal financial systems, reflected, among 
oth~r things, in a much lower money base velocity. Many also have a 
very narrow tax base and the administrative and political constraints on 
raising taxes and cutting public spending may be more severe than in the 
industrialized countries.. Even in Britain in the immediate post-World 
War II years, when money base velocity was about 5, the cost of a 10 per­
centage point increase in the debt-output ratio would (with a constant 
velocity) only have been a 1 percent rise in the inflation rate. Note 
that the relative atractiveness of seigniorage versus explicit taxation 
is not affected if we recognize that the real interest rate is likely to 
increase with the debt-output ratio, as this affects the amounts to be 
raised through seigniorage or taxation equally. 
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4. Deficits, Debt and Solvency 
The ultimate nightmare of every Chancellor of the Exchequer must be. 
the notion of state bankruptcy, of a default by the government on some or 
all of its liabilities. We get some idea of what such a doomsday scenario 
implies by disaggregating the government budget identity (l') as in (12) 
(12) 
Total government exhaustive spending is broken down into consumption 
spending, cG; depreciation of the public sector capital stock, o KG, 
where c is the depreciation rate and KG the public sector capital stock; 
and net public sector investment, i.G, i.e., G =cG + c~ + i.G. There are 
two further sources of government revenue. The first is income from 
G .capital pKK, where PK is the rate of return on public sector capital 
appropriated by the government. This could of course be negative and 
need bear no relation to the social rate of return on public sector 
capital. The second is the income accruing to the government from its 
ownership of natural resource property rights pNNG. North Sea oil 
revenue would fall into this category for Britain. On the left-hand 
side of (12) one further financing mode is recognized: the sale by the 
government of its assets, specifically of its ownership claims on natural 
resources which are sold at a price pN. All sales of existing assets 
properly belong to the "financing" category. They are put "below the 
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line" or on the left-hand side of (12). As noted, the public sector 
financial deficit (PSFD) in principle conforms with the left-hand-side 
of (12), the PSBR does not. It includes certain financing items (such 
as the sale of public sector assets when this involves a loss of public 
sector majority ownership) as current revenue (above the line). The 
reasons for this uniformative way of presenting the data are lost in 
history. iG on the right-hand-side of (12) represents net investment 
spending on currently produced capital goods only. The privatization of 
British Telecom belongs on the left-hand-side. Foreign assets and liabil­
ities are omitted for simplicity. 
While the statistics contain seris for cG, pKG, and i_G, the mapping 
of the statistical aggregates into the economic categories of consumption, 
depreciation, and capital formation is very unsatisfactory. Current 
expenditure on education and health is classified as final consumption 
rather than (in part) as human capital formation or as depreciation. Law 
and order and defense should not be classified as consumption but either 
as spending on intermediate goods (i.e., not counted directly in value 
added at all) or as a form of capital expenditure. 
a. The solvency constraint 
If expected (ex-ante) rates of return on all assets are equalized, 
we can solve (sum or integrate) the government's current period budget 
identity over time and obtain the public sector's intertemporal budget 
identity given in (13) 
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. 
BS(t) + pL(t)BL(t)) M( + PV(T, t, rs)+ PV(-p, t, rs)+p< t) 
PV((pK-l)K, t, rs)+ Q(t) 
PV(cG, t, rS) denotes the present value, at time t, of the govern­
ment's planned or expected real consumption spending programme, from now 
until Kingdom Come, when rs is the instantaneous discount rate. 21/-
Similarly, PV(T, t, rS) is the present value of the government's real tax­
transfer programme and PV(M/P, t, rs) the present value of future real 
seigniorage. Equation (13) states that the present va:lue of the govern­
ment's consumption programme (on the left-hand-side) should equal its 
"net worth," the excess of the value of its assets over its liabilities 
(on the right-hand-side). Its assets are partly tangible (and potentially 
marketable) and partly intangible (and non-marketable). The stock of 
publicly-owned capital is valued by the present value of the future quasi­
rents accruing to the public sector, i.e., pK(t) ~ PV( Pg:, t, rs) and 
natural resource property rights are valued by the present value of the 
income accruing from their exploitation, pN(t) - Pl/(~, t, rs). 
Note again that PK(t) (and/or PN(t)) could be negative, if the public 
capital stock (natural resource endowment) is operated at a loss. There 
are two intangible assets in the government's balance sheet: the present 
value of future taxes net of transfers Pll(T, t, rS); and the present value 
. 
of future seigniorage PV(M/p, t, rS). On the liability side, there are 
the two interest-bearing financial debt instruments Bs and BL. ']d/ 
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Government net worth is an increasing (decreasing) function of the 
size of the future public sector capital formation programme to the extent 
that the shadow price of public sector capital (pK) exceeds (falls short 
of) its opportunity cost which, without loss of generality, we set equal 
to 1. If, at the margin, public and private sectors use capital with an 
equal degree of inefficiency, public sector capital formation does not 
alter public sector net worth. By the same token, privatization of public 
sector assets or nationalization of private assets (on private market 
terms) affects public sector net worth only to-the extent that the assets 
are used with different degrees of efficiency in the public and private 
sectors. PV((pK-l)K, t, rs) measures the present value of the future 
planned public sector capital formation programme. 
The last item in the intertemporal budget identity finally perm.its us 
to turn it into anintertemporal budget constraint or solvency con:straint. 
It is easily checked that nt is the present value of the government's 
expected net terminal tangible liabilities. 23/ The solvency constraint is 
Sl(t) -= 0, which gives us (14) as the public sector's intertemporal 
present value budget constraint. 
(14) 
. 
PV[T - cG + (pK-l)K, t, rs]+ Pv(:, t, rs), 
The solvency constraint sets a limit on the growth, in the very long 
run, of the government's planned or expected net marketable or tangible 
liabilities. 
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If the real interest rate rs exceeds the natural rate of growth of 
output, n, the terminal or transversality condition ~t) = 0 is implied by 
the weak and rather reasonable requirement that the ratio of net market­
able public sector debt to trend output remains bounded. 24/ If the real 
interest rate lies below the natural growth rate, honest Ponzi games 
(servicing existing debt through further borrowing) are perfectly feasible 
and the conditoin n{t) = 0 is arbitrary and ad-hoc. There exist well­
known theoretical models that can be characterized by dynamically 
inefficient competitive equlibria with rs < n. The post-World War II 
experience until the late seventies provides ample evidence of a multi­
year run of (ex-post) real rates of interest below the natural growth rate. 
Following established practice, I'll assume in what allows that, at 
any rate in the long run, rs> n, and impose S?{t) ~ 0 as the government's 
solvency constraint. 
Equation (14) states that the market value of the government's net 
non--monetary debt has to be matched by the present value of the expected 
future primary current surpluses and the present value of expected future 
seigniorage. It can be rewritten as in (14') 
BS( t) + pL( t)BL( t)(14 I) 
P( t)Y( t) 
. 
T-cG + ( Prl)K M 
PV( y , t, rS-n) + PV(PY' t, rS-n) 
Equation (14') expresses the same relationship in terms of net 
debt-output ratios, future primary current surpluses as a share of GNP 
and seigniorage as a proportion of GNP. The relevant discount rate 
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in this second set of present value calculations is the real interest 
rate minus the natural rate of growth. Note that the appropriate primary 
deficit is the government's current account deficit. Public capital 
formation is netted out. Only if the value of public sector capital 
differs from its opportunity cost should allowance be made for public 
sector capital formation. 
Six short points should be made about the formalism of the solvency 
constraint before we turn to the theory and practice of repudiation. 
First, equations (14) arid (14') discount -real values at real interest . ~
rates. An equivalent expression can be derived by discounting nominal 
values at nominal interest rates. 'l:2.I Discounting real values at nominal 
interest rates would be an irrational procedure, although Modigliani and 
Cohn [1981] have argued that such behavior accounts for the undervaluation 
of the stock market in inflationary periods. 
Second, consider what would happen if, contrary to my assumption, 
n > rs. Using the simplified budget constraint b 
. =G + rsb - T, where 
all public spending G is current, all bonds are short, index-linked 
bonds, and there is no money, it is easily seen that the forward-looking 
present value budget identity is not defined. However, the debt-output 
ratio is perfectly well-behaved for any finite primary deficit as a 
proportion of output, d. 
-b( t) = 
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The steady-state value of the debt-output ratio, bis given by 
d
b = 
There is no solvency constraint for this government. There are, 
obviously, "physical" constraints such as the condition that, in a closed 
economy, 0 ( G ( 1. The choice of borrowing versus taxation depends 
exclusively on distributional criteria and on the relative efficiency 
costs of debt versus tax financing. In spite of a positive share of 
public spending in national income, taxes need never be levied and may 
indeed be negative forever. 2:1/ 
Third, the solvency constraint permits us to take a forward-looking 
view of the "eventual monetization" implied by the fiscal-financial pro­
gramme, discussed in the previous section. From (14' ) we get, holding 
M/M and pY/M = v constant: 
M CG - T + (1-PK.)i
(15) M - vR(t) [PV( Y , t, rS-n) + 
BS(t) + pL(t)BL(t) Pl{(t)KG(t) PN(t)~(t)] 
p(t)Y(t) Y(t) Y(t) 
Equation (15) solves for the constant rate of growth of base money 
that is implied, as a residual, to satisfy the solvency constraint, by 
the current and prospective future plans for the primary deficit and the 
initial stock of non-monetary debt. The "net liability" on the right­
hand-side of (15) is annuitized using the long real interest rate net of 
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-the rate of growth of output R. 28/ If the policies summarized in (15) 
are inconsistent with a constant velocity, we can rephrase the question 
.
in terms of the constant (permanent) share of seigniorage in GNP M/pY 
that is implied by the current spending and taxation plans and by the 
already outstanding net debt obligations. This amounts simply to dividing 
both sides of (15) by v. 
Fourth, the various items in the solvency constraint are unlikely to 
be behaviourally independent of each other. The nature of these inter­
dependencies is of course model-specific. For a Keynesian world, e.g., a 
cut in the spending programme PV(cG, t, rS) will reduce effective demand 
and output, reduce the tax base and, at given tax rates and interest rates, 
reduce PV(T, t, rs). Changes in the rate of inflation, brought about 
through changes in the seigniorage programme l'V(M/p, t, rS) may alter 
the future capital intensity of production and thus the tax base. Many 
other linkages can be thought of. 
Fifth, the government's assets net of its liabilities were referred 
to as government "net worth," W. It might be argued that this involves 
a certain abuse of language. W =pKKG + pNNG + PV( T, t, rs) + PV(M/p, 
t, rS) + PV((pK-l)K, t, rs) - [BS(t) + pL(t)BL(t)] is to a large extent a
p( t) 
choice variable of the government (even ignoring the possibility of 
default), as the government can choose, within bounds, its tax-transfer 
programme, its monetary growth targets, and its capital formation pro­
gramme. Whether or not we wish to use the term "net worth," with its 
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connotation of something parametric to the agent, in connection with W, 
the mutual consistency of the consumption programme and W, PV(cG, t, 
rs) =W( t) represents a valid solvency constraint. 
Sixth, it is easily checked that after-tax rates of interest should 
be used to discount future flows of revenues and expenditures (see Buiter 
[1984]). The stream of current and future taxes net of transfers T that 
enters into the present value calculations should be total taxes net of 
transfers minus the receipts from income and capital gains taxes on the 
ass.ets and liabilities appearing in the solvency constraint. 
There has been no empirical attempt to implement the comprehensive 
balance sheet accounting outlined here. In a recent paper, John Hills 
[1984] presented estimates of some of the less conventional assets and 
liabilities. His "full" balance sheet of the public sector is presented 
below in Tables. 
It includes estimates of pKG~ (physical assets, but excluding much 
of the social infrastructure (roads, sewers, etc.); since very few of 
these social overhead assets yield any cash return to the public sector, 
omission is not a serious matter for the purpose of constructing the 
public sector comprehensive balance sheet.) PNNG is measured by future 
oil reserves and a subset of PV(T, t, rS) is included (corporate deferred 
tax and pensions deferred tax component, state pension, unfunded public 
service pensions). Omitted are the rest of PV(T, • , • ), the present 
value of taxes net of transfers, subsidies etc., PV(M/P, • , • ), the 
present value of future seigniorage and PV((Prl)K, • , • ), the present 
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TABLE 5 
John Hills'estimated "full" balance sheet of the U.K. ublic sector 
(£billion.coat terms. 31 !vlardi 1982 prices) 
1957 1966 1975 1982
(end Dec) (end Dec) (end Dec} {end Mar) 
.dS.utr 
Physical (including
shares and land)' 130 220 ♦ 15 +20 




Corporariona. defen'ed ta:,< 10 
Pensio11a --
deferred cu component• 10-15 20 35-45 60-65 
TOT.JI. 175-180 280 575-585 620-625 
l.ioiiilw 
Financial' 195 195 150 135 
Seate Pension I
• - Buie 235(mu) 340(maz) 390 390-415 
~ - Eamiit!S Rewed +o 
Uofundcd Public Serv~
Pensions' 20 30 90-115 ~ 120-14-0.
TOTAL. ♦50(max) 565(rnax) 630-655 685-730 
NETL/A.BIUTY
7 
275(mu) 285(nwc.) 55-70 65-105 
( All figures rounded to nean:sr £.5 billion) 
I Fi!IJm for physic:al and fin-.ncial asseu and fi1tancial liabilities from Table 1.7.
2 Figures for value of future oil revenues supplied by IFS North Sea Oil Revenue
pru~. See Devereux and Morris (1983) for~ ofoil revenue model. Present
value of fuwre revenues derived using 3% rul discount rate. Oil pm assumed ro
incn:ase in real terms by 3 'JI, per annum frvm level ar date for which estimate is made.
Further details in Hills tl98+), Section C. ·
3 Value of Corporations· defened we liabilit, taken to be twice allowance made by 67 of
the 100 !arJest UK companies (,ee pqe 15 above).
+ Liability ar standanllbasic rare on 75 ~ of righcs in funded tchemes. earnings-rewed
Staie pensions and unfunded public ,ervice pensiom. See H"&lls (198+). Section F.
5 Value of public sector· s liability for basic pensioftS ar cnd-1975 is based on Government
A~'s estimates given in Diamond Commiuioc (1976), Table 38 for 31 March
1976. E.stima1e includes graduated pension rights. Lower limit for basic pensions ar
end-March 1982 based on IIU4Ni &wnw ~ 1983 estimate for mid-financial year
1981-82. For derivation of Other estinwes ,cc Hills (1984), Section£.
6 1957 and 1966 figur= from Roe (1971). For other elOfflaff::I see Hills (198+). Secaoa
E. 
7 Ranges given in 1975 and 1982 allow for imcrr:lependell of - and liability figures
rela.iing to pensions. 
'•c·•• 
·.-;~ ...-=-_'{,,c.,.:.' ;...-.. 
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value of the "excess returns" (if any) from future planned public sector 
capital formation if public sector capital is used more efficiently, at 
the margin, than private capital. While one can quarrel with each and 
every one of Hill's figures, the need to go through an exercise of this 
kind in order to evaluate the feasibility and consistency of public sector 
fiscal-financial-monetary plans is beyond doubt. 
If we take e.g. Hill's 1982 figure of a net liability of between 65 
and 105 billion f's (at March 1982 prices) at face value, this means that 
for solvency the remaining items in the comprehensive balance sheet but not 
in the Rills calculations, should add up to a net asset of 65 to 105 bil­
lion f's. These items are: (1) the present value of future seigniorage; 
(2) the present value of future taxes net of transfers, excluding debt 
service and the taxes and transfers already considered by Hills (oil 
revenues, state and public service pensions, etc.); (3) mit).us the present 
value of public sector consumption; and (4) the present value of any excess 
returns from future public sector investment. 
With annual velocity constant at 20, a non..;inflationary future (with 
M/M = .03, say) and a real interest rate of 3 percent per annum would (in 
1982) have given us a present value of future seigniorage figure of 
13.9 billion f's. Doubling this or halving this, it remains small beer 
(a mere 0.15 percent of GDP in the illustrative example). The remainder 
amounts to £51.1 billion to £91.1 billion in 1982. With the real interest 
rate 2 percentage points above the trend real growth rate, this represents 
the need for a "residual" 29/ permanent primary surplus of between 
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0.37 and 0.66 percent of GDP. Adding back in the annuitized value 12_/ of 
future oil revenues, the deferred tax component of pensions and taking out 
the annuitized value of public sector pension liabilities, raises the 
required total permanent primary surplus to between 3.1 and 3.7 percent 
of GDP. Interest payments on the public debt were 5.3 percent of GDP in 
1982. 1lJ A conventionally measured public sector financial deficit of 
between 1.63 and 2.2 percent of GDP in 1982 would therefore ha:ve been 
"sustainable" according to these back-of-the-envelope calculations. One 
can contrast this with the kind of sustainability calcu1ation that ignores 
all intangible assets and liabilities and proceeds as follows. Jnt.erest­
bearing public debt is 50 percent of annual GDP in the United Kingdom. 
·The trend growth rate of real GDP is, say, 2.5 percent per year. Assume 
inflation is to be stabilized at, say, 5 percent per year. The interest­
bearing debt-output ratio will therefore be stabilized when new bond 
issues are 3.75 percent of GDP. With the income velocity of circulation 
of base money constant at 20, say, the sustainable PSFD as a proportion 
of GDP would be 4.1 percent. If a zero inflation scenario is envisaged, 
the sustainable PSFD as a proportion of GDP (ignoring any effects of lower 
inflation on the debt-output ratio and on velocity) would be 1.4 percent. 
b. Sustainable fiscal-financial-monetary plans 
The "balance sheet" solvency constraint in (14) or (14') in one 
sense tells us all there is to know about solvency. Feasible or consistent 
fiscal, financial, and monetary plans should satisfy this identity. Any 
particular set of plans or projections may, however, fail to satisfy this 
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identity. If a government attempted to implement its spending, tax­
transfer and monetization programme, insolvency, i.e., debt repudiation 
would occur to satisfy, ex-post, the constraint that was violated ex-
ante. There are a number of alternative ways of measuring the extent or 
magnitude of the departure from solvency, each one of which emphasizes a 
feature of the plans already implicit in the balance sheet solvency 
constraint. Such measures of inconsistency can be expressed, for instance, 
as flow deficits or deficits as a proportion of output. This brings out 
the sustained or permanent changes in spending programmes, revenue raising 
programmes, or seigniorage plans that are required to eliminate the 
ex-ante discrepancy in the government's comprehensive balance sheet. 
c. The "permanent deficitt' 
Consider an inconsistent or infeasible fiscal-financial-monetary 
plan. This is characterized by PV(cG, t, rs) - W(t) =o. Such an excess 
or shortfall of spending over resources will not, of course, be observed 
ex-post. Something will give to re-establish ex-post equality, whether 
this takes the form of changing PV(cG, t, rs) or W(t) or both. 
The "permanent deficit," F, is the real perpetuity equivalent or 
annuity value of the discrepancy in the government's ex-ante comprehensive 
balance sheet. It is given by: 
(16) F(t) - R(t) [PV(cG, t, rS) - W(t)] 
R(t) is the coupon yield on an index-linked ("real") consol or the long 
real rate of interest. 32/ 
- 49 -
F, the "permanent deficit share" measures the constant fraction of 
trend GNP, Y, that corresponds to the balance sheet discrepancy. It is 
given by (17). 
R(t) [PV(cG, t, rS) - W(t)](17) F(t) 
Y(t) 
While these ex-ante "permanent deficits" will not materialize ex-post, 
let alone be permanent, they do represent the perma11ent adjustment that 
must be made, to spending, to receipts, or to seigniorage, in order to 
achieve solvency. 
Two further informative deficit measures are the constant net worth 
deficit, Fw, and the permanent income deficit, FP. It is easily checked 
that the expected rate of change of public sector net worth is given by 
The current level of public sector consumption spending can be said 
to be sustainable if it keeps net worth constant (ex-ante). This will be 
the case when real public sector consumption equals rsw, the current 
expected real rate of return times public sector net worth. The constant 
net worth deficit is then given by 
(19) = 
If one's criterion for the sustainability of current consumption 
involves the maintenance of a constant (ex-ante) ratio of public sector 
net worth to capacity output, the sustainable consumption level is given 
by (rS-n)W. The constant net worth share deficit is then defined as 
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cG(t) - (rS(t) - n)W(t)
(20) 
Y(t) 
The level (share) of public sector consumption consistent with 
constant net worth (or a constant net worth share) will be subject to 
anticipated fluctuations over time if the short real interest rate varies 
over time. A permanent income approach to the sustainability of public 
sector consumption plans has been proposed by Miller (Miller [1983], 
Miller and Babbs [1983)). The highest indefinitely sustainable constant 
level of public sector consumption (or public sector permanent income) is 
given by R(t)W(t). The anticipated rate of change of permanent income is 
given by R(t)[R(t)W(t) - cG(t)]. The permanent income deficit can then 
be defined as 
(21) rP(t) -= cG(t) - R(t)W{t) 
Finally, if a constant share of public sector consumption in trend 
output is taken as one's criterion for the sustainability of current con­




Each of these "permanent deficits" measures the magnitude of the 
long-run inconsistency, expressed as a flow of spending or income, in the 
government's fiscal, financial, and monetary plans, according to some 
notion of long-run sustainability. As presented here, the measures 
singled out current public current spending on goods and services 
(public consumption) from all other outlays and receipts. It should, 
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however, be clear that the sustainability of any public spending programme 
can be evaluated simply by transferring the present value of the relevant 
outlays (e.g., transfer payments plus subsidies) to the left-hand-side of 
the present value budget constraint. The augmented public spending 
measure, GA, its present value PV(GA, t, rS), and the corresponding 
augmented public sector net worth measure, wA, can then be put through 
their paces as in equations (16), (17), and (19)-(22). 
None of these measure convey any information about the short-run or 
long-run stance of fiscal policy as regards its effect on aggregate 
demand. To obtain measures of fiscal stance or fiscal impact on the 
economy, an explicit model of the economy is required. The solvency 
constraint and the various permanent deficit measures are merely a useful 
accounting framework for organizing facts and plans about fiscal, financial, 
and monetary policy, and for evaluating the mutual consistency of spending 
and revenue projections, public sector debt objectives, and monetary 
targets. It behavioral content is limited t.o the (restrictive) assumption 
of certanty equivalence that permitted us to equate ex-ante expected 
rates of return on all non-monetary assets. To make the forecasts of 
future tax receipts, transfer payments and real interest rates required 
to implement the present value and permanent deficit calculations, some 
model of the economy will of course in general be necessary. 
d. Debt repudiation 
What happens if current plans, projections, and expectations add 
up to a violation of the solvency constraint and PV(cG, t, rS) > W(t)? 
The government could achieve a consistent set of plans by cutting spending 
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(PV(cG, t, rS)) or by raising taxes (PV(T, t, rS)). It could also try to 
fill the hole in its balance sheet by increasing the revenue brought in 
. 
from seigniorage (PV(M/P, t, rS)). An increase in the revenue accruing 
from the public ownership of capital would also help close the gap. (This 
would be an increase in PK in equation (14')). Finally, if at the maring, 
public sector investment yields cash returns in excess of (below) its 
opportunity cost, an increase (decrease) in the scale of the public 
• s 
sector investment programme could do the trick (PV((pK - l)K), t, r )). 
If a corrective combination of such policy measures is not implemented, 
the residual item in the present value budget constraint, the real value 
BS(t) + pL(t)BL(t)
of public sector debt · · . will h.ave to give.' p(t) ' 
We already reviewed the option of reducing the real value of debt 
and debt service by inflation. This leaves the option of cutting real 
debt and debt service by repudiation or. special taxation (capital levies, 
forced loans or conversions, and special levies on government debt). 
Arithmetically, repudiation (partial or complete) would seem to be a 
means for reconciling otherwise inconsistent spending and revenue plans. 
Why then don't governments make use of it more frequently? One reason is 
that repudiation or a massive capital levy is perceived as a breach of 
public faith and is politically and electorally unattractive. The point 
is well-made by the Committee on National Debt and Taxation (1927, 
P• 295-296). 
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"We do not suggest that a levy would necessarily arouse
feelings of the most violent kind. We are convinced, however,
that it would be strongly resented ••• exceptional circumstances
are required to reconcile the owner of capital wealth to the
levy idea. The opposition is no doubt founded partly on
political suspicion and on prejudice: to impose a capital
levy would be, as Mr. Keynes expressed, to insult a set of
very strong irrational feelings in men, and such grounds of
opposition are exceedingly difficult to overcome. It is
possible that time may bring a change of ideas." 
Second, repudiation or a major capital levy would not just represent 
a redistribution of wealth from rentiers to tax-payers, but would also be 
likely to have serious consequences for the private financial system. 
The enforceability of private contracts will be in doubt when the govern­
ment is openly or effectively in breech of contract (implicit or explicit). 
Finally, if a government considers it likely that it may wish to borrow 
again at some stage in the future it will (since the terms on which it 
will be able to do so will reflect its reputation) weigh the advantages 
of current repudiation against the enhanced future cost of debt service 
should it repudiate now. Using the analysis made familiar in the liter­
ature on (Third World) external debt and repudiation, the rate of return 
payable on the public debt will include a risk premium reflecting the 
probability of default. Beyond some point, however, a further increase 
in the risk premium payable on the debt may make repudiation so much more 
attractive to the debtor that a rational lender would prefer not to 
increase his exposure. Credit rationing results: the government cannot 
borrow more on any terms. 33/ 34/ 
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The preceding considerations make it seem unlikely that a government 
in one of the major industrialized countries would resort to wholesale 
repudiation of domestically-held public debt under peace-time conditions. 
In the aftermath of a war or following a major change in the political 
regime, however, rough treatment of private holders of public debt has 
not been uncommon. 
In France in 1770, when the government faced the financial consequences 
of its participation in the American War of Independence., Abbe Terray 
effectively repudiated one-fifth of French government debt through a 
forcible refunding operation (see c. Kindleberger [1984, p. 217)). 
Ricardo, in the years following the Napoleonic wars, advocated a 
capital levy, and in Parliament said that such a tax was the best, in 
fact the only, way of handling the burden of accumulated wartime debt 
(Kindleberger [1984, p. 62)). This proposal was not taken up, however. 
More recently, Germany has had two monetary reforms in the last 62 
years, both of which involved a form of capital levy. After the hyper­
inflation in 1923, a mortgage on agricultural and industrial land served 
as backing for the new currency, the Rentenmark. The German monetary 
reform of 1948 consisted of a conversion of all money and debts at 10:1 
(except for the first 60 Reichsmarks of currency per capita). Since 
private debtors had, for the most part, paid all their private creditors 
by then, the conversion involved mainly public debt. A further capital 
levy (or Lastenausgleich) of 50 percent on the value of all real property 
and equity holdings was intended to correct at least in part the inequity 
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as between owners of debt (which suffered a reduction in value of 90 per­
cent) and owners of real assets and shares of corporations. For political 
reasons, the capital levy was introduced in September 1948 separately 
from (and slightly later than) the conversion. ]l/ 
For Italy, a capital levy to reduce the burden of the debt has been 
advocated recently by Basevi and Giavazzi [1983). The distinction between 
.. legitimate" or conventional tax increases and confiscatory capital 
levies is of course one of degree rather than kind and inevitably involves 
an element of subjective judgement. There would seem to be no economic 
or moral grounds for giving priority to safeguarding the owners of govern­
ment debt against unexpected levies in preference to owners of real indus­
trial and human capital. As regards Britain, with a debt burden that is 
low by historical standards, with a safe middle-of-the-pack position 
among the major industrialized countries in terms of the level, and a 
uniquely favourable position as regards the trend of the debt-output 
ratio, the spectre of de jure or de facto repudiation should not haunt 
the holders of the British public debt. Most other industrialized coun­
tries would seem to be in a similar position, although the high and 
rising debt burdens of Italy and Belgium (see Table 1) might be a cause 
for concern to those with a high propensity to wor_ry. 
"Selective" repudiation of the public debt (e.g., through an open­
ended Ponzi-style rescheduling of externally-held debt) has been more 
common. The Latin American foreign debt repudiations of the 30s and the 
recent de facto external insolvency of Poland, Zaire, and a number of the 
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smaller Latin American countries are reminders of the possibility of 
sovereign default. All the more so since none of these defaults involved 
the kind of dramatic political upheaval and change of regime that led to 
the repudiation of the Tsarist debt by the new Soviet regine and of the 
Batista debt by the Castro government in Cuba. Nevertheless, the condi­
tions, whether political or economic, that have historically been associated 
with repudiation of externally-held public debt, seem sufficiently 
different from those faced by today's industrialized countries that even 
such "selective" debt repudiations seem rather unlikely. 
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5. Crowding Out 
Even if there is no fear of eventual monetization of the deficit and 
if the government can credibly commit itself to the pursuit of a fiscal 
financial-monetary policy mix that does not imply explosive and unsustain­
able growth of the debt-output ratio, there may still be objections to 
policies involving larger deficits and debt-output ratios. The argument 
against debt-financed fiscal expansion is often cast in terms of the 
"crowding out" of private economic activity by fiscal policy actions. 
shall continue to focus my discussion of crowding out on an analysis of 
the consequences of substituting public borrowing for tax financing of a 
given exhaustive public spending programme. These consequences include 
the effect on private saving, investment, and the current account of the 
balance of payments in ·the short run, and on the capital intensity of 
production and the country's net external asset position in the long run. 
Much of what I shall be saying can be applied (with obvious modifications) 
to the analysis of bond-financed increases in exhaustive public spending 
or even to tax-financed increased in exhaustive public spending (i.e., 
balanced-budget fiscal expansions). With lump-sum taxes, perfect capital 
markets, and effectively inifitely-lived private households, the substi­
tution of borrowing for tax-financing has no effect on any real (or 
nominal) economic variable. To avoid such implausible debt neutrality 
features while retaining the optimizing approach so dear to economists, 
it is sufficient to adopt the overlapping generations model 12._/ (without 
operative gift and bequest motives) or the uncertain lifetimes model. E__/ 
I 
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Institutional or information constraints on lending and borrowing activi­
ties of private agents further shorten their effective decision horizons 
through a variety of liquidity constraints, cash-flow constraints, large 
spreads between lending and borrowing rates and other capital market 
imperfections. The models underlying the discussion of crowding out in 
this section all rely on differences between public and private sector 
opportunity sets as regards the terms and conditions of access to capital 
markets. Frequently this dependence is, as with the familiar Keynesian 
demand multiplier, only implicit. The non-lump sum nature of taxes will 
at times be important in the discussion that follows. 
a. Qld-Fashione<i Keynesian Short-Run Crowdin~ Out 
The "short run" of old-fashioned Keynesian or classical crowding 
out refers to the assumption that changes in the outstanding stocks 
(private non-human wealth, dometic capital, government debt, high-powered 
lllO.ney, and net foreign assets) brought about by the flows (private saving, 
investment, government borrowing, monetization, and foreign investment) 
over the period under consideration are very small relative to the stocks 
and can be ignored. Expectations (of future interest rates, exchange 
rates, prices or demand) are also taken as given, i.e., ignored. 
"Crowding out" in what follows refers only to what I have called 
elsewhere "indirect crowding out." "Direct crowding out" occurs when 
government instruments (especially public spending) are arguments in 
private utility functions or production possibility sets. "Indirect 
crowding out" refers to the effects on the level and composition of output 
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of tax cut or a spending increase, without these government controls 
directly affecting utility or production, but only through effects on 
budget constraints, interest rates, exchange rates, wages, or prices 
(Buiter [1977]). 
"Keynesian" means that demand effects only are considered. In terms 
of the familiar IS-LM, aggregate demand-aggregate supply analysis, we 
aconsider the horizontal shift of the aggregate demand schedule (at 
given price level) and the composition of that change in terms of changes 
in investment, consumption, or the current account balance. Supply con­
straints are assumed to be non-binding (the aggregate supply schedule is 
horizontal over the relevant range). 
The closed economy version of this model is givey in equations (23) 
to (27). 
+ I(r) + G = y I'< 0 (IS)(23) C(Yd, W) 
(24) i(r, Y, W) = M i ( O; iy) O; l) tw) 0 (LM)p 
(25) yd Y+ ~ -T- p 
M+B
(26) w - p 
(27) T = 00 + 01y + 62rp 
B 0 < 61 < l; 0 ( 6z ( 1 
A tax cut (say a reduction in 60) will shift the IS curve to the 
right in Figure 6a. At the initial interest rate, and the initial price 
level, the new income-expenditure equilibrium moves from Eo to Eo'• The 
income-related demand for money increases and since monetary policy is non­
accomodating (the nominal money stock is fixed) interest rates rise and a 
FIGURE 6 
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I 
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new IS-LM equilibrium is established at E1- The movement from Eo to E1 
represents "crowding out." Whether this crowding out should be attributed 
to the fiscal stimulus or to the unwillingness of the monetary authorities 
to expand the ~oney supply in an accommodating manner to keep r from 
rising above ro is a semantic question. Given the path of the money stock, 
the degree of crowding out varies inversely with the interest sensitivity 
of money demand. 
What is crowded out? In the closed economy represented in Figure 6, 
it is either C or I. The conventional story runs in terms of income tax 
cuts. With current disposable income an argument in the consumption 
function, and investment a decreasing function of the interest rate and 
independent of (or only weakly increasing with) the level of economic 
activity, private consumption at E1 is higher than at Eo and private 
investment is lower. 
A different picture emerges when the tax cut takes the form of an 
investment subsidy. This case is represented in Figure 6c. Now both 
private consumption and private investment are increased at E1• Of course 
private investment is lower at E1 than it would ahve been at Eo' (at the 
lower level of interest rates) but it is higher than at Eo• 38/ 
What could make the demand mulitplier negative? Mankiw and Summers 
[1984] have argued that taxes may enter the money demand function directly. 
Output, Y, according to their argument, is a very inappropriate transac­
tions variable and should be replaced by consumption or disposable income. 
While one can agree with their characterization of current output or 
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income as an inadequate measure of transactions demand, the same objec­
tions would seem to apply to current consumption or current disposable 
income. These too ignore intemediate transactions (which add up to a 
total several times larger than transactions in final goods and services) 
and transactions in existing assets (which dwarf all other transactions). 
It also takes money to pay taxes or to save (i.e., to acquire non-monetary 
assets). Finally, the alternative motivation of the scale variable in 
the money demand function, associated with Milton Friedman, is in terms 
of per111anent income or wealth rather than current "work to be done" or 
transactions needs. This suggests permanent disposable income as a scale 
variable, not current disposable income, except to the extent that current 
realizations are a good proxy for unobservable permanent values. 
Algebraically, the Mankiw-Sutnmers theory simply involves the substi­
tution of (24') for (24) 
(24') = M tr ( O; ty > O; o < tw < 1p d 
It is clear that, since a tax cut shifts the IS curve to the right and 
the LM curve to the left, the net effect on output is qualitatively 
ambiguous. ]ii The interest rate of course rises unambiguously. A 
strong effect of disposable income on money demand and a strong response 
of investment to the rate of interest make a negative multiplier more 
likely, a higher marginal propensity to consume and interest sensitivity 
of money demand make it less likely. 40/ The balanced budget multiplier 
always equals unity. 
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In an open economy with a freely floating exchange rate and perfect 
capital mobility, fiscal policy cannot affect the level of output. A tax 
cut boosts private consumption (or investment) and crowds out the current 
account surplus through an appreciation of the nominal and real exchange 
rate. The IS curve ( 23) is replaced by ( 23'). X denotes the trade 
balance surplus, e the nominal exchange rate, r* the exogenous world 
interest rate, and p* the exogenous world price level. 
(23') C(Yd, W) + I(r) + G + x(ep*) = y X' > 0 
p 
(28) r = r* 
b. Old-Fashioned Clas.sical Short-Run Crowding Out 
In a closed economy setting, classical crowding out refers to 
the inevitability of public spending crowding out private spending or of 
tax cuts crowding out one category of private spending at the expense of 
another when resources are utilized fully. In the simplest version, 
perfect wage and price flexibility produce a vertical aggregate supply 
schedule. If the "full employment" level of employment and output is 
independent of tax rates and public spending, 100 percent crowding out is 
inevitable, regardless of the government's monetary policy. While in a 
Keynesian setting ,crowing out can always be viewed as evidence of badly 
managed monetary policy (or perhaps more fairly as evidence of insuffi­
cient coordination of monetary and fiscal policy) this is not true at 
full employment. Any boost to demand will raise wages and prices but 
leave output and employment unchanged. The incentive, or allocative 
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effects of tax cuts and spending increases may of course alter labour 
supply or demand and thus alter the full-employment level of output and 
employment even in the short run. In the open economy versions (equa­
tions (23'), and (24)-(28), with Y = Y and p flexible), expansionary 
fiscal policy again cannot affect global (domestic and foreign) demand 
for home goods. The price level will remain constant (just as the level 
of output remained unchanged in the Keynesian regime) and the exchange 
rate will appreciate to crowd out the current account surplus. Inter­
mediate regimes with an upward-sloping aggregate supply schedule give 
outcomes that, not surprisingly, lie between the pure Keynesian and pure 
classical regimes. 
c. Old-FMhioned Ke:p_tesian :Long-Run Cro"vTding Out 
The recognition that bond-financed public sector deficits imply 
a cumulative gro"vTth of the outstanding stock of debt and that this 
"intrinsic" dynamic would shift the LM and IS curves, if wealth effects 
on money demand and consumption demand are present and if government debt 
is perceived as net worth at least to some extent, generated the "govern­
ment budget constraint literature" (Christ [1968], Blinder and Solow 
[1973], Tobin and Buiter [1976]). The simplest models ignored asset 
accumulation other than through public sector deficits (e.g., private 
capital accumulation and foreign wealth dynamics through the current 
account of the balance of payments). The Keynesian version continued to 
treat the price level as given and output as determined by effective 
demand. The government budget identity (29) augments the closed economy 





p G + ~ - T p 
Consider the case of bond-financed deficits (M = 0). Regardless of 
the nature of the fiscal policy action (or other exogenous shocks) that 
causes a deficit or surplus, as long as the deficit (surplus) persists, 
the IS curve will be shifting to the right (if Cw> 0) and the LM curve 
to the left (if iw > 0). Solving the IS and LM equations for rand Y 
as functions of B, M; and the fiscal parameters, we get the short-run 
reduced form or IS-LM solutions for rand Y: 
(30a) HM< 0; HB > 0; He < 0, i=l,2,3; HG> 0 
i 
(30b) 
Substituting this into the budget identity and linearizing around a long­
run stationary equilibrium, we find that the model will be stable if 
Left to themselves, deficits feed on themselves. First consider the 
case where taxes and transfer payments do not adjust to changes in the debt­
service component of the budget (82 = 0). The stability condition (31) 
is now easily interpreted. Higher debt means higher debt service at any 
given interest rate (r > 0) and a higher interest rate for any level of 
debt (HBB > 0). Only if debt issues, through a strong wealth effect on 
consumption (Cw>> 0) raise the tax base (Y) by enough to raise income­
related taxes (81Y) by more than the total increase in interest costs, can 
this economy ever settle down in a balanced budget equilibrium after a 
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disturbance. Explosive debt growth is certainly possible with this 
particular (and perhaps rather implausible) specification of the fiscal 
policy rule: fixed values of G, 60, 61, and 62 with 62 = O. 
Stability or instability is, however, a function both of the para­
meters describing the behavior of the private economy and of the para­
meters describing government behavior. If, e.g., the authorities had a 
fiscal decision rule which raised taxes (lowered transfer payments) 
whenever r(B/P) increased, stability would become much more likely. With 
a positive short-run effect of bonds on output (FB > 0), a value of 82 < 1 
will stabilize the debt-deficit process. Even if FB < O, there exists a 
value of 82 (greater than 1 in this case), which will smother the debt 
explosion. !::1,_/ There are many alternative debt-stabilizing tax-transfer 
functions, and the addition of exhaustive public spending G to the 
arsenal of potential debt-stabilizing instruments only reinforces the 
conclusion that an explosive debt-deficit spiral is a policy choice rather 
than a deep structural property of the economy. 
One can check that, with 62 = O, if the inodel is siable, a bond­
financed tax cut has a stronger expansionary effect on output in the long 
run than a money-financed tax cut. 42/ I don't consider this result, due 
to Blinder and Solow, to have much policy relevance. It amounts to a 
restatement of the (very strict) stability conditions for this model 
under the given specification of the public spending and revenue functions. 
If this model is to be stable under bond financing, then endogenous 
income-related tax revenues must outstrip the explosive intrinsic debt 
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dynamics. This can only happen if a larger stock of bonds raises demand 
(and thus output) to such an extent that tax revenues grow faster than 
debt service. 
The major weakness of this class of models is that the significance 
of a dynamic analysis (and a comparison of stationary equilibria) which 
extends into the long run the assumptions of nominal wage and/or price 
rigidity and demand-constrained output of the sho.rt-run Keynesian model, 
is not too apparent. A further problem has been that the focus on fixed 
price, zero-trend real growth models has at times led to the identifica­
tion of stationary equilibria with balanced budget equilibria. Stationary 
equilibria are more generally characterized by stationary stock-flow and 
stockstock ratios. Nominal asset stocks can grow (shrink) at the sum 
of the growth rates of the general price level and the level of capacity 
output. These shortcomings have been rectified in a number of places 
(e.g., Buiter [1979]) by adding some version of an augmented Phillips 
curve to the Blinder-Solow model and thus combining short-run nominal 
rigidity with long run nominal wage and price flexibility. 
It should be intuitively obvious that adding an exogenous capacity 
constraint or full-employment output constraint to the IS-LM-government 
budget constraint model, worsens the prospects for stability under the 
usual specification of the taxation and public spending functions. The 
reason is that the tax base (the exogenous level of real income) cannot 
expand in the long run to offset the effect of higher interest payments 
on the deficit. Stability can now be achieved only if a larger stock of 
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debt raises the general price level by enough to lower the real value of 
debt interest payments r(B/P) even though their nominal value increases. 43/ 
If full-employment output is endogenous in the long run, say through 
private capital formation, prospects for stability under the given tax­
transfer and spending rules are even dimmer. This is because debt-financ­
ing almost certainly raises short- and long-term real interest rates and, 
except in a Keynesian demand-constrained regime, lowers Tobin's "marginal 
q" and thus the incentive to invest. There will be downward pressure on 
the tax base through this channel and thus a greater likelihood of debt­
deficit instability. The lasting insight from the government budget 
constraint literature is that it made it very clear that questions such 
as ••what is the effect on output of an increase in public spending by an 
amount x," are badly (because incompletely) worded. One must specify 
both the U.nancing mode and the run (impact, steady-state or "real time•· 
over some given horizon) to which the question applies. Answers take the 
form.of a financing mode-contingent sequence of dynamic multipliers. 
The open economy versions of the Keynesian budget constraint literature 
(see e.g., Branson [1975], [1976), and HIE(2) [1985]) added much that is 
of interest, but for our purposes the essentials of debt-dynamics in 
Keynesian models are represented adequately _by the closed economy models. 
Rather than spending any time on old-fashioned classical long-run crowding 
out (see e.g., Buiter [1979] and Tobin [1976]), the important insights of 
the classical perspective will be discussed within a rational expectations 
setting. 
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d. Portfolio Crowding Out 
Tobin (1961, 1969] extended the Keynesian two-asset (money­
banks) model with its implicit assumption of perfect substitutability in 
private portfolios between bonds and claims on capital to a general three­
asset (money-bank-capital) model. The effect on investment of an increase 
in the stock of debt will depend on the relative degrees of substitutability 
of bonds vis-a-vis money and bonds vis-avis capital. When bonds and 
capital are closer substitutes, art increase in debt will raise the required 
rate of return oil capi:tal along with the interest rate. When bonds and 
money are closer substitutes, an increase in debt will lower the·required 
rate of return in capital although the interest rate will still rise. 
Friedman [ 1985] and Frenkel [ 1983] have provided empirical evidence, 
using U.S. data and a capital-asset pricing version of the money-bonds 
model, on the effect of changes in the stock of debt on the yield differ­
entials between bonds and capital. In general, these will be a function 
of asset supplies, the degree of risk a'\>'ersion, and the perceived correla­
tion of asset returns. Frenkel finds negligible effects of relative 
asset supplies on yield premia. Friedman finds statistically significant 
and small but non-negligible effects. Their evidence, however, relates 
to the relative required rates of return on bonds and capital. The 
effect of debt onthe overall level of rates of return is not analyzed. 
A zero effect of realtive asset supplies on the bond-capital return 
differential (the traditional Keynesian perfect-substitutes case) is of 
course quite consistent with a strong crowding out effect of debt through 
the level of common required rate of return on bonds and capital. [See 
also Friedman [1984] and Vance Roley [1983].) 
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e. Rational Expectations-Augmented Keynesian Crowding Out 
Within the Keynesian tradition, the incorporation of forward­
looking rational expectations of endogenous variables has made an impor­
tant contribution to our understanding of the effects of fiscal policy on 
aggregate demand. lntertemporal speculation or arbitrage entered the 
Keynesian models in two ways. First, in closed economy models, through 
an arbitrage condition linking short and long interest rates (or short 
interest rates and a stock market-index) and second, in open economy 
models, through an arbitrage condition linking the exchange rate and 
domestic-foreign interest differentials. Not only must the financing 
mode and the run be specified before an answer to any question concerning 
the effects of tax or spending changes can be given, but the manner in 
which information about the policy instruments (and about all other 
~11:ogenous "fundalilentals") accrues to and is absorbed by private agents 
must be detailed. Inthe certainty-equivalent world inhabited by most 
linear or log-linear rational expectations macro-models (where expectations 
can be viewed as being held with complete subjective certainty), the 
model cannot be solved unless one knows whether the behaviour of the 
exogenous variable (s) is: (a) unanticipated or anticipated (and if the 
latter, when); and, (b) perceived as permanent, transitory, or rever­
sible. 44/ The structure of the model and the current, past, and expected 
future values of the exogenous varibles determine the current behaviour 
of the economy. It is impossible to study the short-run behaviour of the 
model without at the same time and as part of the same exercise, solving 
for the entire future (expected) behaviour of the model, including its 
long-run steady-state properties. 
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The easiest way to see what this implies for the crowding out debate 
is to modify the IS function in the model of equations (23) to (27) in 
the spirit of Blanchard [1981] as follows: 
( 23") C( Yd , W) + I( R) + G = Y I' < 0 
Investment depends inversely on the long interest rate, R. The demand for 
money depends inversely on the short interest rate. The long and short 




( 32) r = R- -
R 
In this model, the effect of an unanticipated, immediate and permanent 
cut in taxes (or increase in spending) is the same as it is in the simplest 
rate enters both the money demand functionKeynesian model where the short 
and the investment function. (Note that debt-deficit dynamics are not 
included.) What is different is that in this model the impact effect of 
the unexpected announcement (at to) of a future expansionary fiscal policy 
move (a cut in taxes or increase in spending at t1 > to) is contraction­
ary. The intuition is clear. Between the announcement date (to) and the 
implementation date (t1) there is not yet any direct stimulus to demand 
from higher spending or lower taxes. Investors in financial markets do, 
(afterhowever, take into account the future outward shift of the IS curve 
t1)• Short-term interest rates are therefore expected to be higher after 
t1, when the fiscal boost gets under way. 
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The current long rate (R(to) can be viewed as a forward-looking 
moving average of future expected short rates. 44/ At the announcement 
date, to, therefore, the long rate increases in line with the higher 
expected future short rates. This will shift the IS curve to the left 
in (r-Y) space, lowering output and the short rate of interest. The 
behaviour of taxes, output, and of long and short rates is sketched 
below in Figure 7. The main point is that the announcement effect of an 
anticipated futut'e fiscal expansion will result in a negative impact 
multiplier. When the fiscal stimulus finally occurs at t1, output will 
of course rise in the manner indicated by the traditional short run 
IS-LM model. 
A role very similar to that played by the long rate of interest 
in the closed economy model is played by the (real) exchange rate in the 
rational expectations version of the open economy model with perfect 
capital mobility and a freely floating exchange rate. As before, we use 
the open economy IS curve (23'). Equation (28) is now, however, replaced 
by the uncovered interest parity condition: 
(28') 
The nominal exchange rate at time tis therefore given by the 'long run 
equilibrium exchange rate times the exponent of the integral (sum) of all 
future expected foreign-domestic nominal interest differentials: 45/ 
en*The real exchange rate, c =~,can also be seen to be given by thep . 
long-run equilibrium real exchange rate times the exponent of the inte-
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A fiscal expansion which is immediate, permanent, and unanticipated 
raises all current and expected future domestic interest rates; given 
foreign interest rates, the nominal exchange rate will "jump" appreciate: 
e falls. Given r* and the domestic and foreign price levels, the real 
exchange also jump-appreciates. In this case, it is easily checked that 
there will be full crowding out: output does not increase as the fiscal 
stimulus is negated by a loss of competitiveness. An anticipated future 
fiscal expansion will be contractionary as the exchange_rate appreciates, 
because of the expectation of future higher domestic interest rates, 
before the demand stimulus from the fiscal expansion occurs. 
Both these examples of negative fiscal announcement impact multi­
pliers have nothing to do with deficits per se. They would occur even if 
the fiscal stimulus were of the balanced-budget variety ·and indeed as a 
result of any anticipated private or public, domestic or foreign shock . 
that shifts future IS curves to the right. To highlight the role of 
deficits in a rational expectations setting, we revert to the closed­
economy model with long and short interest rates, and the budget con­
straint. 
(23") C( Y + r! - T, M+B) + I( R) + G = Y p p 
M+B) M( 24) £( r, y, p = p 
. . 
p R
( 33) r - Et- = R - Et-·p R 
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p = ijJ(y - y) + JJ 
The price lvel is predetermined, i.e., given at a point in time, and 
output is demand-determined. Over time, however, the price level adjusts 
to excess demand or supply according to an augmented Phillips curve. 
Full employment output is exogenous. The long.!!:.!!. interest rate (R) is 
linked to the short real rate, r - P/P, through the expectations hypothesis 
(equation (33)). To keep the dynamic analysis simple, I assume that the 
government uses a combination of money financing and bond financing which 
keeps the shares of money and bonds in total government debt (a and 1-a 
respectively) constant, i.e., 
(35a) M = ab 
(35b) B = (1-a)A 
(35c) A = M + B 
The augmentation term in the price-Phillips curve (equation (34)) 
is the policy-determined proportional rate of growth of total nominal 
government liabilities. 
(35d) JJ 
The specification of the monetary-fiscal-financial decision rules in 
this example is: exogenous G, a andµ. Taxes are therefore endogenously 
determined. An increase in JJ, given G, can only be brought about by a 
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tax cut. Leto= ~/p, the real stock of money plus bonds. r = H(R, o;G 
µ, a) and y = F(R, o~ G, µ, a) are again the IS-LM solutions for 
randy. 
In the neighborhood of a steady-state equilibrium R, 6, the behavior 












I-R(Hc; - 1jl FG) R(l-Hµ + 1j!Fµ) -ij,FG -1j,Fµ 
If government debt is net wealth, the IS curve shifts to the right 
in r-y space when o increases. (Note that since investment depends on R 
and not on r, the IS curve is vertical in r-y space.) An increase in o also 
increases the demand for money (if R.w > O) which tends to shift the LM 
curve to the left. A fraction a of the increase in the government's 
liabilities is in the form of money issues. This lends to shift the LM 
curve to the right. Thus, while F0 > O, an increase in o will raise 
the short interest rate, r, if a is small (in a high-debt economy) but 
lowers it if a is sufficiently large (a low-debt economy),£! i.e., H0 
will be positive for small a and negative for large a. For reasons of 
space, only the high-debt economy is considered in what follows. The 
system described in (36) has one predetermined state variable o and one 
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non-predetermined one, R. For there to exist a unique convergent saddle­
point equilibrium, it is necessary and sufficient that F0(1-HR) + 
FRiio > O. In the low-debt economy (which behaves more or less like an 
economy under pure money financed deficits) this condition is always satisfied. 
In the high-debt, low a economy, which behaves approximately like an 
economy under pure bond financing, explosive behavior cannot be ruled out 
a priori. If there exists a convergent saddlepoint equilibrium, it is 
likely to have the configuration shown in Figure 8, with an upward-slopoing 
saddlepoint SS'. 49/ 
The long-run effect of an increase inµ is a larger real volume of 
total government debt (o increases) and a higher R (and r). 221 An 
unexpected, immediate and permanent increase inµ (which implies a short­
run and long-run tax cut) causes the long real interest rate to jump 
immediately from Eo to Eo1, onto S1S1, the convergent saddlepath through 
the new long-run equilibrium at E1. There will, however, be a recession 
during the entire adjustment process. We know this because the real 
stock of government liabilities rises throughout the adjustment process. 
This can only happen if the rate of inflation is below the nominal rate 
of growth of these liabilitiesµ. From the Phillips curve it is clear 
that this requires y < y. It is therefore not impossible to come up with 
examples in which even immediately implemented "expansionary" fiscal 
policy (e.g., a permanent tax cut) will have a depressing effect on real 
economic activity because the anticipated future deficits and the bias 
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The adjustment to an unexpected permanent tax 
cut in the rational expectations-augmented Keynesian 
model with gradual price adjustment: an example of 
super crowding out. 
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enough to induce more than 100 percent crowding out of private interest­
sensitive spending in the short run and throughout the adjustment process. 
Because capacity output is exogenous, crowding out aross steady states 
is of course 100 percent. 
Other ways of generating a negative impact-demand multiplier is 
through confidence effects. If private agents are unsure about the 
sustainability of the government's fiscal policy stance, and more speci­
fically, if there is some 
0 
probability of explosive debt accumulation, and 
eventual repudiation, a risk premium will be added, both to short and long 
interest rates. Formally, this works pretty much like an increase in R 
in the previous two models. 
There is little, if any, direct or indirect evidence on the likelihood 
of negative mulitpliers in the circumstances faced by the major industrialized 
nations today. · 
f. Rational Expectations -- Augmented Classical Crowding 
Out and the Imeossibility of Cutting Taxes 
This is a suitable point to bring out one of the consequences of 
the government having to satisfy its intertemporal budget constraint. 
Given the real exhaustive spending programme, and given the revenues from 
future seigniorage, a tax cut today requires, on average, a tax increase 
tomorrow if the government is to satisfy its solvency constraint. We 
should therefore talk of an intertemporal reallocation or redistribution 
of taxes and transfer payments. Consider the following very simple 
government budget identity. There is no money, one real short government 
bond, B, public spending G, and taxes net of transfers T. 
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. 
( 37) B(t) G(t) + rS(t)B(t) - T(t) 
The solvency constraint is 
T 
-1 rS(u)du 
lim B( T) e t = O 
T+<X> 
or 
(38) B(t) + Pl/(G, t, rS) Pl/( T, t, rS) 
B(t) is inherited from the past. Pl/(G, t, rS) is not automatically given 
when the entire current and future path of G is given, because current 
and expected future real interest rates need not be invariant under the 
changes in fiscal policy that are being considered. The simplest case 
is the small open economy whose external terms of trade are exogenous 
and constant and whose internal rate of interest is determined exclusively 
by the exogenously given world rate of interest r*. W This makes 
Pl/(G, t, rS) independent of any changes in the policy mix. The authori­
ties merely reshuffle a given present discounted value of taxes over time. 
A current tax cut must imply a future tax increase of equal present value. 
That is not to say that such a reallocation of taxes towards the future 
will have no effects. In a classical, rational expectations model such 
as Blanchard's [1985), uncertain lifetimes cause the private sector to 
discount future income and taxes at a rate higher than the government's 
discount rate, rs. A sequence of early tax cuts followed by a later 
tax increase of equal present value when discounted at rs, will represent 
a net reduction in the present value of current and future taxes when 
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discounted at the higher rate rs - \ where A > O is the premium of the 
private discount rate over the government's discount rate. 52/ This 
boost to private sector human capital will have the familiar result of 
boosting consumption, lowering private saving in the short run, reducing 
the current account surplus, and reducing private non-human wealth in 
the long run. In the small open economy, the capital-output ratio is 
held in place by the world interest rate, and long-run crowding out 
takes the form of a reduction in the country's financial claims on the 
rest of the world. 
In a closed economy or an open economy large enough to influence the 
terms of trade or the world interest rate, the path of rs will be a 
function of the government's financing policy. In Blanchard [1984, 1985] 
and Buiter [1984] it is shown that it is still true that an early tax cut 
requires a later tax increase (if the public spending programme is held 
constant) or a later exhaustive spending cut (if the tax-transfer programme 
is held constant except for the early cuts). The real interest rate rises 
immediately and stays high even when in due course the tax cuts are 
reversed. The reason is that in the meantime, a sequence of government 
budget deficits has added to the total outstanding stock of debt, which 
keeps interest rates high at home and abroad. Investment declines at 
home and abroad in the short run and in the long run the capital intensity 
of production is lowered. Domestic public debt thus crowds out capital 
formation at home and abroad. It also results in a domestic current 
account deficit and a long-run reduction in the home country's net 
external asset position. 53/ 
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At the risk of stating the obvious, I would like to pont out a 
pitfall in the interpretation of steady-state analysis. Let G and T be 
constant in the steady state. Assume for simplicity that the long-run 
growth rate of real output is zero. The long-run or steady-state govern­
ment budget identity is 
T - G(39) B = 
rs 
Assume rs> O. Equation (39) appears to suggest that the way to reduce 
the outstanding stock of government debt in the long run is to cut taxes 
or raise public spending. This of course is nonsense. Consider the case 
where rs is constant and tax receipts do not respond to variations in 
economic activity. It is clear that the bud.get identity (37) describes 
unstable, explosive behaviour of the public debt. A tax cut implies 
higher borrowing in the short run and therefore higher de,bt and increased 
debt service and yet higher borrowing in the long run. The correct inter­
pretation of (39) is that if a country wishes to have lower taxes (or 
higher exhaustive public spending) in the long run, it will have to reduce 
its debt service burden. In a small open economy, this means that the 
country has to achieve a transition to a lower stock of debt. (In a 
closed economy or a large open economy, the reduction in debt service 
could be eased by achieving a lower interest rate in addition to a 
lower debt volume). Given G, the "traverse" from a high value of B to a 
low value of B will be achieved by tax increases, generating budget 
surpluses that, over time, permit a lower value of debt service. Only 
then can taxes be cut to achieve a long-run equilibrium with a lower 
volume of debt and a lower value of taxes. 
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The same caution in interpreting steady-state multipliers is required 
when one considers the long-run net foreign asset position of a country. 
The current account identity is given in (40). Its steady-state version 
is given in (41). F denotes net claims on the rest of the world (yielding 
r* > 0) • 
. 
(40) F Y + r*F - (C +I+ G) 
C+I+G-Y(41) F 
r* 
Equation (41) could be misinterpreted as indicating that in order to 
increase one's long-run holdings of net foreign assets, one should boost 
' absorption (C +I+ G) relative to income. What it means instead is 
that if a country wishes to increase its long-run absorption relative to 
its domestic income, it should acquire foreign assets. In real time, 
the process of foreign investment requires a lowering of real absorption 
relative to domestic income. 
There are two qualifications to these results concerning the inter­
temporal reallocation of taxes (of primary surpluses more generally). 
First, the models of Blanchard [1984, 1985), Buiter [1984), and Frenkel 
and Razin [1984) are full employment models. The cost-benefit analysis 
of an intertemporal tax reallocation programme may be very different if 
the initial situation is one of Keynesian unemployment, as it is then 
possible, in principle, to boost private consumption in the short run 
without this requiring the crowding out either of private domestic capital 
formation or of net foreign investment, as domestic output is demand­
constrained. 
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Second, real world taxes are not lump-sum but typically take the 
form of a tax rate (or schedule of rates) applied to a tax base such as 
value added, wages, profits, or sales revenue. Consider again the simplest 
case where tax receipts are an linear function of value added, Y. For 
example, 
While it is still true that (given spending) a cut in total taxes 
(T) now requires an increase in total taxes later, it is not necessarily 
the case that a cut now in either 60 or 61 will require a future increase 
in either 60 or 61. The tax base, Y, could increase sufficiently as a-
result of the early tax rate cut (or incrase in thresholds) to permit 
the higher required future taxes to be raised at an unchanged (and con­
ceivably even lower) tax rate and an unchanged (or higher) threshold. 
The contributions of Blinder and Solow [1973], and Tobin and Bulter 
[1976], discussed earlier, analyzed this possibility in a Keynesian 
fixed-price setting, ~/ and in the case of Tobin and Bulter, in a full­
employment, flexible price setting. No stable Keynesian model that I know, 
however, has the property that a cut in 60 or 61 will boost output on 
impact to such an extent that total tax receipts actually increase and 
deficits fall in the short run. That feat, as we saw, can only be 
achieved in the long run if the positive wealth effect on consumption 
demand of a larger stock of public debt outweighs the effect on money 
demand by enough to generate an increase in taxable income that is 
sufficient to service the increase in debt at the new lower tax rates. 
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The classical version of the Keynesian super-multiplier is the Laffer 
effect; lower tax rates lead to a reduction in distortions and misalloca­
tions and boost incentives to work, save, invest, and innovate to such an 
extent that "full employment" output increases by enough to generate increased 
tax revenues at a lower tax rate. I know of no empirical evidence to 
support the proposition that (the absolute value of) the elasticity of 
the tax base with respect to the tax rate is greater than unity. It goes 
without saying that even without the extreme versions of the Keynesian 
demand multiplier and Laffer's supply multiplier being relevant, careful 
attention to both the demand-(de)stabilizing properties and the (mis)­
allocative effects of tax changes is essential for economic policy design. 
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6. Measures of Fiscal Stance 
The discussion of Section 5 should have made it clear that in order 
to obtain a measure of the effect of the stance of fiscal policy on aggre­
gate demand, one needs: (a) a model of the economy; and (b) a benchmark 
or reference specification for policy. As regards the first, I can 
only restate the conclusion reached by Blinder and Solow [1974] that 
there are no "model-free" measures of fiscal impact on aggregate demand. 
Different views on how the economy works will give rise to conclusions 
about the demand effect on fiscal policy measures (whether they be isolated 
changes in the values of certain instruments or changes in the parameters 
describing fiscal and financial decision rules) that may differ not only 
in magnitude but even in direction. The need for a benchmark or reference 
path is equally obvious. "Expansionary (or contractionary) relative to 
what?" should the immediate response be to the question as to whether 
the stance of fiscal policy is expansionary or contra:ctionary. If total 
tax receipts increase, is this a discretionary move to tighten fiscal 
policy (the reference point is the pre-existing level of taxes) or the 
automatic resonse of tax receipts to endogenous fluctuations in economic 
activity, according to an unchanged tax rule such as T = 80 + 81Y, 81 > 0 
(the benchmark is the original parameters of the tax function). As long 
as one is explicit about the benchmark reference path or "origin" for 
one's comparison, there should be no confusion on this account. 
Certain conclusions about much-abused fiscal indicators are worth 
stating explicitly: 
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1) There is no existing model of the economy that yields the public 
sector deficit, the change in the public sector deficit, its 
share in GDP or the change in its share in GDP as a measure of 
fiscal impact on demand, short-run, long-run, or real-time. 
2) There is no existing model of the economy that yields the 
cyclically corrected (full employment) deficit, the change in 
this deficit, its share in GDP or the change in its share in GDP 
as a measure of fiscal impact on aggregate demand in any run. 
3) There is no existing model of the economy that yields the 
cyclically and inflation-corrected deficit (its change, share in 
GDP or change in its share in GDP) as a measure of fiscal impact 
on aggregate demand in any run. 
From (2) and (3) it follows e.g., that both the OECD's and 
the IMF's fiscal impulse measures are uninformative as measures 
- of fiscal impact on demand ( see IMF [ 1 985 l and OECD [ 1982, 1985]) • 
4) There is no existing model of the economy that yields the level 
or change in the debt-GDP ratio as a measure of fiscal impact on 
aggregate demand in any run. 
What would a proper measure of fiscal impact on aggregate demand look 
like? Basically, it involves a comparison of two simulations (or two 
sets of stochastic simulations) of an economic model with different sets 
of parameter values in certain fiscal and financial decision rules. 
Sometimes, with very simple models, this can be done analytically. In 
the old-fashioned static, expectations-innocent, closed-economy Keynesian 
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model of equations (23) - (27) with the specific benchmark policy G = G 
(exogenous) and T = 61 + 61Y, the (impact) effect on aggregate demand 
of fiscal policy given an accommodating monetary policy (r constant) is 
(42a) dy = K[dG - Cy d6o - Cy Yd61]
d d 
1(42b) K = 
The (impact) effect of fiscal policy on aggregate demand under a 
non-accommodating monetary policy (M constant) for this model is: 
(43a) 
(43b) 
Notice that the fiscal parameters dG, d6o, and d61 are multiplier­
weighted and that these weights are evaluated at the actual (not necessarily 
the cyclically-corrected) level of output: 
Contrast (42ab) and (43ab) with the measure of fiscal impact that 
comes out of Blanchard's classical model with rational expectations and 
uncertain lifetimes (Blanchard [1985]). 
The effect of public spending on goods and services and lump-sum 
taxes on consumption demand (at given current and expected future interest 
rates) denoted f(t) is given by: 
s 
m -f (r(u)+A)du 
(44) f(t) = G(t) - (A+ p)Et f G(z)e t ds + 
t 
s 
m -f (r(u)+A)du 
(A+p)(B(t) + Et f (G(s) - T(s))e t ds) 
t 
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A is the instantaneous probability of death, P the private sector's rate 
of time preference and B(t) the outstanding real shock of interest-bearing 
debt. The first two terms on the right-hand-side of (44) give the effect 
of balanced-budget (tax-financed) exhaustive spending. Spending on goods 
and services by the government only boosts demand if current spending 
exceeds its "permanent" or average future expected value. When P = r, 
e.g., a constant level of spending has no effect on demand. The third 
term on the right-hand-side of (44) is zero if private decision horizons 
are infinite (A= 0). It is positive if horizons are finite (A> 0). 
This presents the effect of debt-financing. Bonds are "wealth" if A > 0 
and consumption demand is ,an increasing function of the outstanding 
stock of bonds. Note how in (44), unlike in (42a) and (42b), expectations 
of future spending, taxes, and interest rates must be modelled to obtain 
the current demand effect of fiscal and financial policy. 
While these two illustrative fiscal stance measures are at opposite 
ends of the modeling universe, they do convey the right flavour of the 
range of views on the fiscal stance that different economists (or even 
the same economist at different times) can hold. 
It is informative to look at some of the indices that have been 
(ab)used as measures of fiscal stance. Figure 9a graphs five measures 
of fiscal stance for the United States and Figure 9b does the same for 
the United Kingdom. For both countries the change in the actual general 
government financial deficit as a percentage of GNP is shown and two 
measures of the change in the cyclically-corrected (full employment or 
structural) deficit as a percentage of GNP, one constructed and published 
---
FIGURE 9b 
Five _general government fiscal impu_l_se measures: UK • 
(Change in (adjusted) deficit as a percentage of actual or potential GNP). 
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Five general government fiscal impulse measures:USA. 










0 ·· .. ·......,,..- "\J ,, ~ " •w ,,,._,;,:\1, ,,,-:•·r " 'l' ~ ...'1 l'i"\"'"I 'I r • 7,' -~ , J.,4 ) .V • ,,:t( ', 1.j.\.~ I(,_• .,• '"Ill{; • ',.,,_::::KA' -•
'Ill' ··~ \ 1' . . • 
ft •,, ,' •••• If 1, ••• 
-1 . ,,,."'" ■ a .,,_, - ,;t,.t ,,,•·· 





1:371 1:378 1:384 
.._. U~b 4•i r,1"fLI\Ti•1..i ,4"11) ('(cLt.-.ll'( (c,t,(l.f<'Tti)
11D m.m !~; ..t ! ACTlAI\ L "" a . ( c,·E.cJ>) 
1111 •Ii;" ·1;:1, : C cl ,(l\ll't' ra «~ €.ITTo ,,..,. II'"' L 
1111111 " .,..,, ,1..11 'I' (C:, I:.<. i)) :,: .. ,,'.!t• ,,::II : i) M• <~ 11r-v 
■ us 3:, C'{cLt11Hy (of.\l.,.c,Ei:>
(:CHF) xO 
- 91 -
by the IMF and one by the OECD. Also for both countries we have the 
change in the inflation-corrected and cyclically-adjusted general govern­
ment financial deficit as a percentage of GNP. Finally, for the United 
States, there is a short run of figures giving an estimate of the change 
in Blanchard's measure of fiscal stance in equation (44) and for the 
United Kingdom there is a set of NIESR estimates of the change in "demand­
weighted," cyclically-corrected deficit measure. The latter represents 
an attempt to estimate the impact 55/ effect of discretionary fiscal 
changes on the demand for currently produced domestic coutput in a simple 
Keynesian world. 
The summary statistics provided in Tables 6, 7, and 8 show that the 
different indices tell quite different stories. For the United States, 
over the brief period for which all five measures are available (1978-84), 
the divergence between the various indices is smallest. Even here, the 
mean change in the deficit as a percentag.e of GNP lies between 0. 36 for 
the actual deficit and 0.O0 for Blanchard's measure. The standard devia­
tion of the actual deficit change is about twice that of the other measures. 
The measures are all positively correlated, but the correlation ranges 
from a high of 0.88 (between Blanchard's measure and the IMF's cyclically­
corrected measure) to a low of 0.58 between the IMF's cyclically-corrected 
deficit measure and the actual deficit. Considering three of the measures 
for the United States over a longer period (1972-84) in Table 7, we see 
that while the actual deficit measure is both larger on average and more 
volatile than the two cyclically-corrected measures, the three are rather 
highly correlated. 
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Table 6. The Behavior of Five Indices of Fiscal
Stance in the United States, 1978-84 1/ 
Standard
Variables Mean Deviation 
Actual O. 36 1.46 
Cyclically-corrected
(OECD) 0.14 o. 7 0 
Cyclically-corrected
( IMF) 0.33 a. 61 
Inflation and cyclically
corrected (0ECD) 0.16 o. 88 
Blanchard O. 00 0.88 
lJ Change in ( corrected) deficit as a per--
centage of actual or potential GNP. 
Correlation Matrix 
Actual 1. 00 
Cyclically
corrected o. 78 1.00
(OECD) 
Cyclically
corrected o. 58 o. 86 1. 00
( IMF) 
Inflation and
cyclically o. 83 o. 86 o. 76 1. 00
corrected (OECD) 
Blanchard o. 72 o. 84 0. 88 o. 64 1. 00 
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Table 7. The Behavior of Three Indices of 
Fiscal Stance in the United States, 1972-84 
Standard 
Variable Mean Deviation 
Actual 0.12 1. 79 
Cyclically-corrected 
(0ECD) -. 008 0.81 
Inflation and 
cyclically-




corrected o. 78 1. 00 
(OECD) 
Inflation and 




Table 8. The Behavior of Five Indices of Fiscal 
Stance in the United Kingdom, 1973-84 1/ 
Standard 
Variable Mean Deviation 
Actual O. 18 
Cyclically corrected 
( OECD) -0. 23 1.74 
Cyclically corrected 
( IMF) -0. 01 1. 61 
Inflation and 
cyclically 
corrected ( OECD) -0. 05 2. 93 
Demand-weighted, 
cyclically-
corrected (NIBSR) -0.21 1. 15 
11 Change in ( corrected) deficit as a 
percentage of actual or potential GNP. 
Correlation Matrix 
Actual 1. 00 
Cyclically 
corrected (OECD) 0.75 1. 00 
Cyclically 
corrected ( IMF) o. 69 o. 99 1. 00 
Inflation and 
cyclically 
corrected (OECD) o. 39 o. 65 o. 64 1. 00 
Demand-weighted, 
cyclically 
corrected (NIBSR) o. 64 o. 65 o. 69 o. 09 1. 00 
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For the United Kingdom (Table 8), the five measures behave very 
differently over the period 1973-84. The mean change in the deficit as 
a percentage of GDP ranges from 0.18 for the actual deficit to -0.23 for 
the OECD's cyclically-corrected measure. The change in the actual deficit 
is the least volatile of the five measures while for the United States it 
was the most volatile. The wildest swings are exhibited by the inflation 
and cyclically-corrected deficit measure of the OECD because of the great 
volatility of ex-post U.K. annual inflation rates over the period. The 
IMF's and the OECD's cyclically-corrected measures are almost perfectly 
positively correlated. Very low correlations are recorded for the actual 
deficit and the inflation and cyclically-corrected deficit (0.39) and for 
the demand-weighted cycUcally-corrected deficit and the inflation and 
cyclically-corrected deficit (0.09). 
Incorrect measures may sometimes give the right answer: the man who 
always insists it's twelve o'clock will be correct twice a day. Blanchard's 
measure and the NIESR's measure have the virtue of being model-based. 
Those who like the model must like the measure; those who disagree can be 
explicit and precise about the nature of the disagreement and so arrive at 
their own preferred model-based measure. All the other measures do not 
have interpretations as indices of the impact of fiscal policy on aggregate 
demand. Some (e.g., a superior version of the cyclically- and inflation­
corrected deficit) may be crude approximations to one of the "permanent 
deficit" or solvency measures. 
In general, the information required to obtain a measure of fiscal 
impact on demand consists of the following: 
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1) A model of the economy (one hopes for one that respects stock­
flow identities and treats expectations seriously). 
2) A specification of the length of the run over which one wishes 
to measure the impact of fiscal policy. 
3) A full specification of the benchmark and the alternative 
policies. This includes the following: 
a) How fiscal policy is parameterized (the tax and spending 
functions) 
b) How monetary and financial policy are parameterized. (1s 
monetary policy fully accommodating, non-accommodating, or 
something in between? What is the exchange rate rule? etc. 
4) A full specification of how information about the changes in 
fiscal and fi.nanc:lal policy actions or rules is disseminated to 
and processed by the private sector. This includes at least a 
characterization of the unanticipated-anticipated, current­
future, and permanent-transitory aspects of the policy change. 
All this is hard work. It is also essential for informed policy 
debate. It is possible that there are reasonable shortcuts, but we 
won't know this until we have first obtained the results from following 
the correct procedures, which can then be compared with the answers 
suggested by seat-of-the-pants methods. 
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7. Conclusion 
Probably more uninformed statements have been made on the issue of 
public sector debt and deficits than over any other topic in macroeconomics. 
Proof by repeated assertion has frequently appeared to be an acceptable 
substitute for the more conventional methods of proof by deduction or by 
induction. The public debt in the long run, and (except under some 
rather special parameterizations of fiscal and financial policy) the 
public sector deficit in the long run and in the short run are endogenously 
determined by the interaction of the economic system and the government's 
policy rules. As with all predetermined or endogenous variables, observa­
tions on public sector debt and deficits contain information about the 
current state and future evolution of the economy, i.e.~ they are signals 
from which the careful practioner can extract information. The practical 
problem is that (changes in) debt and deficits can signal almost anything, 
depending on the nature of the exogenous shocks perturbing the system and 
on the structure of the rest of the transmission mechanism. A larger 
deficit may signal a loosening of fiscal policy or a tightening of fiscal 
policy (without which the deficit would have been even larger) in response 
to a fall in export demand or a collapse in domestic animal spirits. A 
larger deficit could also reflect a tightening of monetary policy with an 
unchanged fiscal stance. It may signal increased eventual future moneti­
zation, higher expected future taxes, lower expected future spending, or 
a greater probability of debt-repudiation. It may also signal none of 
the above. To determine the significance of the behavior of public debt 
and deficits, we must get away from the dangerous shortcuts of "model-free" 
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single-figure indices of fiscal stance. The way to deal with a complex 
issue is not by pretending that it's really quite simple. The fiscal 
and fina~cial policy choices that co-determine the behavior of public 
debt and deficits are too serious a matter for them to be left either to 
fiscal quacks or to purveyors of conventional wisdom. 
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Footnotes 
* I would like to thank David Begg, Charles Wyplosz, and Charles Bean 
for helpful comments on an earlier draft. My two discussants at the 
Paris panel meeting of Economic Policy, Patrick Minford and Torsten 
Persson, made many useful suggestions. Some throwaway remarks by Alan 
Walters at a conference in September 1984 prompted the discussion of 
negative multipliers in Section 5. 
1/ The theme of this paper, its structure and many of the ideas 
contained in it, were taken from Blanchard, Buiter, and Dornbusch [1985].
The manner in which the present paper follows and extends the ideas of the 
earlier paper would be even more apparent, if the original V'ersion of 
Blanchard, Buiter, and Dornbusch [1985] were in the public domain. The 
published version of that paper, however, does not contain the discussion 
of sovereign debt repudiation that motivated the di$cussion of that tssue 
in thi.s paper. 
2/ See e.g., Webb [1980], Stiglitz and Weiss [1981], Grossman and Hart 
[1983], Williamson [1984], Greenwald and Stiglitz [19841, and Laffont 
[1985]. 
'3/ See e.g., Eaton and Gersovitz [1981a, b], Sachs [1984], Sachs and 
Cooper [ 1984] , and Ghosh [1985] • 
f!.I This assumes that the tax cut is not specifically targeted to invest­
ment, e.g., accelerated depi-eciation or an investment subsidy. See 
Section 5 for a further discussion of this point. 
5/ The debt figures measure public debt at nominal (roughly "par")
values rather than at 1,11arket values. tf data on 'Dlarket values (security
prices and quantities) were available, the change in the debt-output
ratio could be decomposed into four .terms as follows: 
pB is the money price of government securities, B their quantity. Many
different kinds of securities can be incorporated without any conceptual
problems. 
6/ See Buiter [1983], for a discussion of the relative merits of using
short rather than long, and ex-ante rather than ex-post real interest 
rate measures for these calculations. The Bank of England's approach
subtracts from the conventional PSBR the rate of inflation times the 
nominal value of the debt. A correction for foreign currency-denominated
debt is also made. 
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2f "Debt" here and in what follows means interest-bearing debt. The 
term "bonds" will be used interchangeably. 
§1 A• over a variable denotes its instantaneous rate of change, e.g., . 
M =(d/dt)M. 
2f Reserves are, for simplicity, treated as non-interest bearing. 
10/ Models such as Sidrauski' s [ 1967] with infinite-lived households 
chTracterized by a constant pure rate of time preference show no long-run
effect of anticipated money growth or inflation on the real interest 
rate. Money-capital models in the spirit of Tobin [1965] have a negative
long-run effect of higher inflation on the marginal product of capital
and thus on the real interest rate, as portfolio holders switchfrom 
money to real capital in response to a higher rate of inflation. J. 
Carmichael and p.w. Stebbing [1983] found that the data supported a nega... 
ti.ve relationshi,p between the real,. rate of interest and the rate of 
inflation. The proposition that the nominal interest rate was invariant 
under the rate of inflation could not be rejected. See also the papers
collected in Tanzi [1984]. 
11./ Equation ( 5) assumed implicitly that Etdt = dt and that 
Et(:M( t) /P( t)) = M( t)/P( t). 
12/ Earlier estimates of the inflation semi-elasticity of base money
de;nd yielded a value of around -2.0. The seigniorage-maximizing infla­
tion rate would be 50 percent per year in that case. 
V 
c» -1 fS(u)du 
In general, pL( t) = cEt J e t dv 
t 
V T 
T -1 iS(u)du -J iS(u)du 





With a positive nominal interest rate and a positive time remaining to 
maturity, both terms on the right-hand-side of this equation are always
negative. 
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16/ If a government could borrow abroad by issuing debt denominated in 
itsown currency, the foreign exchange value of debt and debt service 
would vary proportionally and inversely with the exchange rate. Debtor 
governments that are foreign exchange-constrained might therefore be 
tempted to use devaluation as a means of improving their foreign exchange
positions both in stock and in flow terms. This may be one reason why 
most major debtor countries have their debts denominated in foreign 
currency, mainly U.S. dollars. It will be interesting to see for how 
long the U.S. government will continue to be able to borrow abroad through
dollar-denominated debt issues, if the United States continues along the 
road that took it from being a major net foreign investor to a zero net 
external asset position early in 1985, and to a future that could make it 
the largest external borrower within a couple of years. 
l]_/ The correction for index-linked debt (introduced in 1981) would 
not yet be numerically significant as the following table shows: 
The Importance o.f Index-Li~ed Debt in the Uniteci Kingdom 
Index-linked Share of index-linked 
Total national debt treasury stock treasury stock in 
Year (£ million)* (£ million) total national debt 
(I) (2) (3) 
1981 113,037 1,000 0.9 
1982 118,390 3,701 3.1 
1983 127,730 5,984 4.7 
1984 142,545 7,665 5.4 
Source: Financial Statistics, various June issues. 
Note: * Nominal amount outstanding at 31st March • 
.!.§_I I am indebted to Patrick Minford for this point. 
19/ If velocity increases with inflation, the inflation cost of an 
increased debt-output ratio is higher since 




av> n; > O; and 1rS aii > 
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20/ A cut in exhaustive public spending of one-fifth of one percent of 
GNP would of course also do the trick. 
z 
"° -! rs( u)du
W I.e., PV (cG, t, rs) =Et J cG(z)e t dz 
t 
22/ Note that we could subtract the real value of the outstanding stock 
ofhigh-powered money M(t)/p(t) as another liability on the right-hand-side 
of (13). We preserve the identity by adding M(t)/p(t) to PV(M/P, t, rs). 
This gives us ~~~~· + PV(t, t, rs) = PV(i5i, t, rS), as the "gross" 
monetary asset of the authorities. It is the present value of the returns 
earned by the central bank through the investment of ... cs entire expected
portfolio at each future date in interest-bearing assets. 




PK(z)~(z) - Plz)NG(z)]e t 
24/ n:t) = 0 can be rewritten as:-·-, ' 
lim Et[M(z) + BS(z) + pL(z)BL(z) 
p(z)Y(z)z+c0 
J)_/ I.e., (14) could be written as: 
Bs(t) + pL(t)B1(t) - p(t)[pK(t)~(t) + pN(t)NG(t)] 
PV(P(T- cG+ (PK- l)K), t, is)+ PV(M, t, is) 
]:i_/ It is assumed for simplicity that rs and n are constants. 
27/ I am indebted to Stanley Fischer for this point. 
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V 
~ -! [rs(u) - n(u)]du- -128/ R( t) - [Et f e t dv] 
t 
];J_/ "Residual" debause it omits certain taxes and transfers whose 
capitalized value was included in Hills' balance sheet. 
30/ Annuitized at R = o. 02. 
-31/ General government interest payments. Source: IMF W.orld Economic ~tlook, April 1984, p. 106. 
z 
-J rs(u)du 
32/ I.e., R(t) [Et 
o,
J e t dz] 
_1- t 
I}J See Eaton and Gersovitz [ 1981a, 1981b], Sachs [1984], Sachs and 
Cooper [ 1984 J, and Ghosh [1985]. 
34/ An interesting and as yet open question is under what conditions a 
policy of "hone.st" debt service is time-consistent, i.e., compatible with 
a sequence of rational moves when pre-commitment is impossible. 
3.5/ See c. P. Kindleberger [ 1984].-
36/ See Diamond [ 1965] ; Barro [ 1974] and Buiter [ 1980]. 
T!J See Yaari [ 1965] ; Blanchard [ 1985J ; Frenkel and Razin [ 1984] , and 
Buiter [1984]. 
]!/ Since it is the after-tax interest rate that represents the 
opportunity cost of holding money, a cut in the tax rate applied to 
interest income would boost the demand for money and shift LM to the 
left, i.e., be contractionary as regards its effect on the financial 
markets. 
1J_/ Feldstein [1984] reaches a similar conclusion via a quite different 
route involving general price level effects in a two-sector model. 
dY 
dT 
The denominator is assumed to be negative. 
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!::lf 62 > 1 means that some taxes are raised (transfer payments are 
lowered) when debt service increases, by more than the increase in debt 
service, not that the marginal tax rate on interest income is more than 
100 percent. 
42/ With 62 = 0, 
H B 





l(HMB~= d 60 - 6i + p e1 + p 7ii° d 60 
B 
If the model is stable, dB/d 60 < 0, and dM/d 60 < o. Since 
r + RB > 0 and HM < O, the long-run effect of bond-financed tax cuts on 
the IS-LM equilibrium level of output is greater than that of money­
financed tax cuts. 
43/ Consider the IS-lM model with a fixed level of output Y =Yanda 
perfectly flexible price level. The tax function is characterized by 
0 < 61 == 62 < 1. The IS-LM solution for r and p are: 
r = H(M, B, 60, 61, G) HM < O·, HB > o. 
p ,.. J(M, B, 00, el, G) JM > O; JB <> o. 
Under bond-financed deficits the stability condition is : 
rB
[r + HBB] - ---JB < 0p 
44/ The degree of confidence with which these expectations are held 
canonly be built in if one is willing to model conditional second moments. 
45/ let e be the long-run equilibrium nominal exchange rate, then 
ao 
e(t) = eEt exp(-f [r(u) - r*(u)] du) 
t 
46/ If c is the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate then: 




!:2/ The short-run efect ov an increase in o or r is given by: 
dr (1-Cl)( O-lw) - llCw+Cii.t)
=d6 (1-Cy)lr 
IS-LM 
48/ In the long run: 
do (Cy-l)lr = 
QdG 
1 ( I'-C ~do r yV/= 
,QdJJ 
49/ I assume 1--HR + 1WR > O; and 
50/ We assume in terms of the notation of footnote 48,........ that n > O • 
51/ This is the case analyzed by Blanchard [1985] and Buiter [1984].
Notraded-nontraded goods distinction is made. 
52/ A is the (constant) instantaneous probability of death in Blanchard's 
model. 
53/ See Tanzi [1985] for a discussion of the international consequences
ofLUS] fiscal deficits. 
54/ The actual question addressed in these two papers concerned the 
stability of the debt process (or the debt-capital process) when the tax 
function takes the form T = T(Y + rB); 0 < T' < 1. The fiscal shock 
considered was an increase in G (or in G + rB), but this doesn't affect 
the argument. 
E_/ I.e., the first-round effects before the demand multiplier has had 
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